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Albstract 
This thesis considers the Chinese housing reforms of the 1990s in the context of the 
previous system and assesses their impact. The PRC housing system evolved 
gradually from 1949 onwards. Described as a "work unit welfare-in-kind housing 
provision system", it was widely perceived as having fundamental flaws and was 
targeted for reform from 1978 onwards. Following a period of protracted 
experimentation from 1978 to 1990, the Chinese government launched a new wave of 
comprehensive housing reforms from the beginning of the 1990s. The four key early 
measures were: rent increases, the sale of public housing, the creation of the Housing 
Accumulation Fund, and the development of Economic and Practical Housing. 
However, these changes had only limited impact, and a new policy, monetised 
housing provision, was introduced in the late 1990s, along with a series of ancillary 
policies. This aimed to prohibit the allocation of housing to employees by work units, 
directing them instead to provide a cash allowance as part of wages; employees were 
directed to purchase or rent accommodation in the market. This was intended to speed 
up the process towards a market economy in the housing sector. 
The fact that housing reforms have such a major impact on all urban families makes 
them extremely sensitive. At the same time, reforms in other areas of the economy are 
dependent on the successful implementation of housing reforms. This thesis analyses 
the impact of the reforms and assesses how far they have succeeded in making 
fundamental changes to the housing provision system. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
In 1978, before the housing system reforms, the monthly rent for a 50 square meter 
public apartment with two bedrooms in the city ofChangsha was only 5 yuan; that was 
equal to the cost of a package of cigarettes at the time. The maintenance cost for such an 
apartment was as much as 150% higher than the rental income. 1 It was an anomaly that 
in socialist China, which was founded on the principle of equality, a large number of 
families in big cities such as Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou had to pack three 
generations, or even four generations into one small room, while some government 
officials had several spacious publicly-owned apartments for themselves and their 
children, and paid very little rent for them.2 By the mid 90s, after years of reform, the 
situation was even worse. In 1997, there were over 70 millions square meters of empty 
housing nation-wide, while over 4 million urban families were suffering from serious 
housing shortage.3 
To understand the above phenomenon, it is necessary to understand the main features of 
the old in-kind housing provision system, which was put in place after the founding of 
the People's Republic of China in 1949. Under this system, housing was provided to 
employees in government institutions and workers in state-owned enterprises 
(simplified as employees in work units hereatter), and an amount was deducted from 
1 Li, Qi Zhufang yu Gaige Beijing: Beijing Urban Development Research Institute 1992, p.38 
2 Shang, Junfeng Gaige de Kundian yu Xingfendian Guangdong: Zhuhai Chubanshe, 1998, pp.4-16 
3 Wang, Xianqing Zhufan Geming Guangdong: Guangdong Renmin Chubanshe, 1998, p.l 
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their wages by the state for centralized housing construction. No housing allowance 
was included in the salaries paid to the employees, and they were entirely dependent on 
their work unit for housing provision. Normally, provision by work units depended on 
such factors as marriage status, age and period of employment, and did not take into 
account an employee's work performance. Given the importance of housing for a 
family or individual, the planned housing distribution system eventually became 
riddled with corruption, as the leaders of work units had the discretion to allocate 
housing to people close to them. Moreover, housing investment funds were unevenly 
distributed among work units by the state. Some work units enjoyed considerable 
housing investment provided by the government; while others had little or none. This 
resulted in inequalities in housing resources possessed by different work units. A work 
unit's share of housing investment allocation depended on such factors as the nature of 
its business or profession, and its relationship with the government, rather than its 
productivity or economic or professional contribution. Like much of the rest of 
economy, market forces did not operate in the in-kind housing provision system in 
China. 
Under the market economy, resources are most efficiently distributed through the 
operation of the market system in which rewards are related to productivity and success. 
This applies to housing too, which is still a kind of commodity. The market economy 
system dictates that work units should determine the wages of employees according to 
their work and contribution, and employees purchase their own goods and services in 
the market place. In other words, there should not be a central deduction from pay for 
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housing as in the past. The employees can then rent or buy their housing in the market 
with their wages. In such a system, housing provision follows the rules of the market 
rather than of the work unit. The cost of housing is then detennined by supply and 
demand, not by administrative decisions and policies. 
From the beginning of the 1990s, China initiated a series of housing refonn measures, 
which were aimed at the commercialization of the housing sector. These included 
policies to raise the rents of public housing, the sale of public housing, the 
establishment of the Housing Accumulation Fund and the introduction of 'Economic 
and Practical Housing'. 
Although the aim of housing commercialization was constantly reiterated, up to the end 
of 1990s, the reforms had not accomplish their stated aim of establishing a new urban 
housing system based on market economy principles. Firstly, the proportion of housing 
investment made by central or local government and work units still amounted to the 
majority of the total investment in urban housing. Secondly, the dual pricing system 
policy created two housing markets: an 'internal housing market' and an 'open housing 
market'. The former still followed the welfare housing system. The latter was very 
limited in its range and size. Thirdly, rent reform failed to stimulate investment by 
individuals in housing and rents of public housing were still subsidised by the 
government and by work units. An examination of China's housing reforms shows that 
they did not fundamentally change the old housing system. Although the reforms had 
some effect, it is clear that the results still fell far short of the stated targets. 
However, what the effects of the housing reforms up to the end of 1990s were, is a 
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matter of debate. The housing reforms of the 1990s were an integral part of the ongoing 
reform of the national economy. They proceeded very slowly, creating a number of 
contradictions, which in turn adversely affected reforms in other sectors. One can even 
argue that without far-reaching urban housing reform, the overall reform effort in China 
will fail. 
Successful housing reform should achieve the following aims. Firstly, it should 
facilitate the development of the national economy. The housing industry is an 
amalgam of various industries, such as the construction industry, construction materials 
industry, engineering industry and so on. The development of a thriving housing 
industry is of great significance to overall economic development. Housing reform can 
strongly stimulate demand for house ownership, promoting the development of the 
housing industry and the national economy. 
Secondly, housing reform should meet the needs of consumers. Along with social and 
economic development, increased income, and changing family circumstances, 
consumers housing requirements in terms of specification and location have also 
changed. Housing reform can stimulate the development of a true market-based system, 
which can in turn better meet the changing demands of consumers. 
Thirdly, housing reform can remove an avenue of corruption. In the in-kind housing 
provision system, leaders of the work units could easily show preference to themselves 
or people close to them in the allocation of housing. Through housing reform, everyone 
will have to purchase housing with his own money in the market, avoiding corruption in 
the allocation process. 
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Fourthly, housing reform is beneficial for social stability. Home ownership is helpful in 
to raising people's sense of social responsibility and their motivation, leading to greater 
social stability. 
Housing reform is important to the success of other reform measures, such as the 
reform of state-owned enterprises and of the labour employment system. Under the 
in-kind housing system, many state-run enterprises had to allocate up to 50% oftheir 
housing to non-employees. This greatly increased their housing burden. 4 For 
employees, it inhibited employment mobility. Once they were allocated housing units, 
people had an unspoken binding relationship with their work units. With housing 
reform, enterprises could reduce their financial burden and increase their 
competitiveness while the employees could move more freely between work units, thus 
promoting further flexibility in the labour market. 
Thus, the housing system has an enormous impact on economic and social development, 
affecting the progress of reforms in many other important areas, such as wage reform, 
social welfare reform, state-owned enterprise reform, etc. 
The need for housing reform gained greater in the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis. 
Boosting domestic consumption was at the cornerstone of China's strategy to weather 
the effects of the crisis and maintain the planned growth rate of around 8% p.a. Home 
construction was seen as one of the sectors that could make a significant contribution 
4 Cheng, Siwei Zhongguo Cheng=hen Zhufang Zhidu Gaige-Mubiao Moshi yu Shishi Nandian Beijing: 
Minzu yu Jianshe Chubanshe 1999, p. 152. This situation occurred, for example, when work unit X's 
employee's spouse was employed by work unit Y, but lived in shared accommodation owned by work 
unit X. 
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towards maintaining domestic demand. Thus, towards the end of the 1990s, housing 
reform became a very important part of China's national economic strategy. 
11 
Chapter 2 Literatlllre Review 
This study relies basically on Chinese language sources. There has been a substantial 
amount of Western scholarship on general economic reform in contemporary China, 
but I have not been able to find works specifically on reform of the housing supply 
system apart from the World Bank report of 1992 .. I have relied Chinese government 
regulations, secondary books and articles by Chinese scholars, data and other materials 
supplied by relevant government departments and by real estate firms. In addition to 
written sources, my work is also informed by discussions and interviews with Chinese 
government officials and people working in the residential property sector. 
2. I Government Regulations 
Four key government regulations promulgated during the 1990s dominated the reform 
effort. They are the: "Notice on Actively Promoting Urban Housing Reform" 
(Guowuyuan guanyu jixu jiji wentuo di jinxing chenzhen zhufang zhidu gaige de 
tongzhi), 5 issued in June 1991; "Directive on Intensifying Urban Housing Reform 
(Guanyu quanmian tuijin chenzhen zhufang zhidu gaige de yijian),6 promulgated in 
5 Hereinafter (the Notice) ,Document No. 30 of Guofa [ 1991] , promulgated by the State Council on 
7th June 1991, in Beijing Fangdichan Zhengce Fagui Huibia n( Collection of Policies and Regulations on 
Beijing Real Estate) Beijing: Beijingshi Chengshi Jianshe Zonghe Bangongshi 1998, pp.415-418 
6 Hereinafter (the Directive) Document No.73 ofGuobanfa [ 1991] , promulgated by the Leadership 
Group in charge of Housing Reform under the State Council, in Gao, Shangquan and Chu, Chuanheng 
eds. Zhongguo Cheng=hen Zhufang Zhidu Gaige Quanshu (Compendium of China's Urban Housing 
System Reform) Beijing: Zhongguo Jihua Chubanshe 1996, pp. 790-793 
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November 1991; "Decision on Intensifying Urban Housing Reform" (Guanyu shenhua 
chengzhen zhufang zhidu gaige de jueding),7 issued in July 1994; and the "Notice on 
Intensifying Urban Housing Reform and Accelerating Residential Construction 
(Guanyu jinyibu shenhua chengzhen zhufang zhidu gaige jiakuai zhufang jianshe de 
tongzhi), 8 issued in July 1998. 
In June 1991, the State Council issued the Notice, which argued for housing reform as a 
basis for improving living conditions and regulating housing consumption in order to 
commercialize housing and develop the housing industry. In proposing appropriate 
readjustment of public housing rents (i.e. phased increases in rents), and the sale of 
public housing, the Notice emphasized the application of "new policies for new 
housing" and better real estate market management. 
In October 1991, the Second Housing Reform Conference was convened, at which the 
State Council Leadership Group in charge of Housing Reform (Guowuyuan fanggai 
lingdao xiaozu) reported on housing reform practice. After the conference, the 
Directive was issued. 
In detailing the implementation of regulations contained in the Notice, the Directive 
first affirmed that urban housing reform constitutes an important part of the overall 
economic reforms, and then argued for a progressive transition from in-kind housing 
7 Hereinafter (the Decision) , Document No.43 of Guofa [ 1994] , promulgated by the State Council on 
18th July 1994, in Gao, Shangquan and Chu, Cuanheng eds. Zhongguo Chengzhen Zhufang Zhidu Gaige 
Quanshu(Compendium of China's Urban Housing System Reform) Beijing: Zhongguo Jihua Chubanshe 
1996, pp.797-801 
8 Hereinafter the Notice ( 1998), Document No.23 Guofa [ 1998], in Beijing Fangdichan Zhengce Fagui 
Huibian (Collection of Policies and Regulations on Beijing Real Estate) Beijing: Beijingshi Chengshi 
Jianshe Zonghe Bangongshi 1998, pp.399-40 I 
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provision to the monetisation of housing provision. This was to start with the abolition 
ofthe low rent public housing system. It also enunciated the four basic principles for 
housing reform: 1. cost sharing between the government, enterprises and individuals; 
encouraging the balanced development of both market-priced rental housing and 
owner-occupied housing in order to mobilize more resources; decentralization of 
decision-making in accordance with local conditions but under common guidelines; 
and transformation of the housing delivery system. Policies on rent increases and 
subsidies, the sale of public housing, housing finance, housing investment and 
construction, housing ownership, and real estate market management were carefully 
explained as well. 
The Notice and the Directive did not achieve their fundamental aim of housing 
commercialisation, although they initiated nationwide housing reforms and set targets 
for these. In 1992, when a real estate market suddenly emerged, the price of 
construction materials rose, causing a corresponding rise in the cost of construction. 
Funds reclaimed from the sale of public housing were inadequate for planned 
developments, resulting in ever-increasing investment on the part of the government 
and enterprises. This caused an increased financial burden, which people tend to ascribe 
to the abnormal development pattern of the housing industry.9 As far as the author is 
concerned, though housing reform was treated as a vital part of the overall economic 
reforms, the Notice and the Directive failed to take account of the relationship between 
9 Cheng, Siwei Zhongguo Cheng=hen Zhufang Zhidu Gaige-Mubiao M os hi yu Shishi Nandian (Chinese 
Urban Housing System Reform-Objective Pattern and Implemenlalion Difficulties) Beijing: Minzu yu 
Jianshe Chubanshe 1999, pp.l30-131 
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housing reforms and the market structure. As a result, the delayed implementation of 
housing reforms increased the gap between house prices and incomes, and the ratio 
between rental and purchase cost, completely negating the effects of previous housing 
reforms. In such a situation, where the housing reform policy overrode the rules of the 
market economy, it was impossible to succeed. 
In 1994, the State Council issued the Decision, which pointed out that the fundamental 
goal of housing reform is to create a new urban housing ·system appropriate to a 
socialist market economy, and to promote the commercialization of housing. It clearly 
stated that with the four housing measures already adopted (rent reforms, sale of public 
housing, establishment of the Housing Accumulation Fund and construction of 
Economic and Practical Housing), an embryonic new housing system would have been 
established by 2000. 
The housing reform measures did help advance reform, but there was still a long way to 
achieve the goals. The Decision did not focus on developing a commercial rental sector 
to stimulate the economy and fulfilllong-term market needs. The dual pricing system of 
cost-price sale and standard-price sale of public housing added to the difficulties for the 
secondary market, resulting in a disorderly market. The Housing Accumulation Fund 
was a good approach of housing reform, but not enough attention was paid to the 
deposit ratio question. The Fund remained too small and, in practice, a substantial 
proportion of it was diverted, so it failed to make a significant impact. Anju housing (a 
kind of Economical and Practical Housing) had to be sold to medium-income families 
at cost price. As a result, developers could not make any profit from the construction of 
15 
such housing. To make up for the losses, they had to raise the cost of the commodity 
housing, resulting in too high price for purchasers. Ultimately, this ran counter to the 
aim of commercialising housing. It was not sensible for policy planners to introduce 
Economical and Practical Housing as a solution to the social welfare problem. 
The four housing reform measures failed to fulfill their intended aim of establishing a 
new urban housing system based on market economy principles. Analysis of the cause 
shows that it resulted from the influence of the dual-track system in housing provision. 
The fundamental reason for this is that the government did not appropriately adjust the 
relationship between housing reform and the market. They favoured their housing 
reform policy over the development of a market economy system. In spite of its clear 
goals, the government failed to focus its housing reform efforts on those goals, failed to 
give full rein to the development of market forces, but attempted to administrative 
measures instead. As Miao Leru, vice manager of Beijing Housing Reform Office, 
argues, housing reform ranks first, the real estate market lies second. Successful 
housing reform is the basis of marketisation. 10 This was typical of the view of 
government officials. The failure was a result of the government attempting to use 
planned economy methods to implement market economy reforms. 
Realising the drawbacks in the system and, more importantly, the function of the 
market, the government issued the Notice in 1998. This clearly stipulated that housing 
provision in kind was to be ended in the second half of 1998 (later postponed till the 
10 Miao, Leru "Fanggai diyi shichang dier" (Housing Reform Is More Important than the Market) in Kan, 
Jun eds. Beijing Fangdichan Shichan- Toushi yu Fenx(Perspective and Analysis-Beijing Real Estate Market 
Year Book) Beijing: Zhongguo Renshi Chubanshe 1998, pp.l78-179 
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first half of 1999), and housing provision be gradually monetised. Moreover, the Notice 
( 1998) emphasised a series of ancillary policies. These included: the application of 
different housing supply policies to different families; the continuation of public 
housing reform; the development of housing finance; accelerating the construction of 
Economic and Practical Housing through various support measures and vigorously 
encouraging the real estate market. 
Monetisation of housing provision advanced housing reform, increased actual demand, 
and helped develop the market, although it did not solve the problem of inequity in the 
public housing stock. 
2. 2. Review of Books and Articles 
The lively 1980s debate in China on housing reform greatly influenced the housing 
reform policies of the 1990s. Some scholars like Zuo Ling affirmed that housing, as a 
special item, is not simply a commodity but has welfare attributes too. Even under a 
commodity economy low-income people should be subsidised, and it is doubtful 
whether the special commodity status of housing makes it suitable for "housing 
commercialisation" treatment. 11 On the other hand, theorists like Qi Mingchen and Su 
Xing insist on the need for housing commercialisation. In their opinion, the aim of 
housing reform is not only to solve the problem of housing shortages, but also to change 
11 Zuo, Ling "Zhufang Zhidu Gaige de Lilun Mangqu" (Theory Blind Area in Housing System 
Reform) in Dangdai Fangdichan Vol, 6 1989, p.29 and "Guanyu zhuzhai jinrong de yanjiu" (A 
Study on Housing Finance) in Zhang, Zuoji Wu, lie and Liu, Zhifeng eds. Zhongguo Zhufang Zhidu 
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the system, devising a system which combines economy and consumer satisfaction to 
the highest possible degree. The commodity nature of housing makes it a natural 
candidate for commercialisation. Housing should be obtained in the market instead of 
by allocation. Market economy principles should be the theoretical foundation of 
housing reform. Although some security of occupancy is needed, this cannot be used as 
an excuse to reject housing commercialisation. Even this security can be achieved 
through economic measures rather than welfare ones. 12 Their arguments are very 
persuasive. Housing has no greater welfare character per se than other commodities. 
Only housing which has been taken into the social welfare system has welfare attributes. 
Realising this is important to understanding the housing reform policy in the 1990s. 
In 1992, Yang Ru and Wang Yukun published a book Housing Reform: 
Self-Questioning on the Theory and the Opportunity of the Reality, which offered an 
early systematic analysis of the problems of, and strategies for, housing reform. 13 In 
addition to analysing the general character of earlier reforms, they looked particularly 
at capital flow and reform structures. They also studied the financial implications for 
Gaige (China Housing System Reform) Beij ing: Gaige Chubanshe 1996, p.514 
12 Qi Mengchen "Shehui zhuyi yu zhuzhai suoyouzhi-lilun yu shijian de lishi yanbian kaocha" (Socialist 
Housing Ownership-a Study on the Historical Change in Theory and Practice) in ZhuZhai Shangpinhua 
Tansuo(Housing Commerlisation Study) Beijing: Zhongguo Chenzhen Zhazhishe 1985,pp. 7-12 and 
"Fanggai mubiao zhi xinguandian pingshuo" (A Review on the New Point of View in respect of Housing 
Reform Target) in Zhrchai yu Fangdichan (Housing and Real Estate) , p.8; Su, Xing "Zenyang Shi 
Zhuzhai Wenti Jiejue de Kuaiyixie" (How to Solve the Housing Problem Faster) in Hongqi (Red Flag), 
Vol. 1, 1980,pp.16 and "Zenyang Renshi Chengshi Zhuzhai Shangpinhua" (How to Understand 
Commerlisation of Urban Housing), in Gao, Shangquan and Chu, Chuanheng eds. Zhongguo Chengzhen 
Zhufang Zhidu Gaige Quanshu(The Whole Book of Chinas Urban Housing System Reform) Beijing: 
Zhongguo Jihua Chubanshe 1996, pp.l-5 
13 Yang, Ru and Wang, Yukun Zhufang Gaige: Lilun de Fansi yu Xianshi de Xuan=he(Housing Reform: 
Self-Questioning on Theory and the Opportunity of the Reality) Tianjin: Tianjin Renmin Chubanshe, 
18 
the government of housing reform, state-owned enterprise reform and housing 
commercialisation. They advocated housing commercialisation but opposed 
privatisation. Summing up the experiences of the housing welfare provision system, 
and earlier reform attempts, they suggested gradual rent increases, the establishment of 
an accumulation fund, and the imposition of obligatory saving for housing. The 
weakness was their failure to acknowledge the difficulty of increasing rents, and come 
up with specific measures to do so. Working in the State Development Research Centre, 
they provided accurate and detailed data, which is frequently quoted by other 
researchers. 
The World Bank report of 1992 China: Implementation Options for Urban Housing 
Reform saw the aim of urban housing reform, as to restructure the sector to fit the wider 
reform agenda. 14 They argued that the overall reform effort would fail if far-reaching 
urban housing reforms were not implemented. The report recommended the need to 
introduce fixed-term, renewable leases for rental units, with limited "consumer 
protection" for tenants, and enforceable eviction rights in the case of failure to pay. The 
linkage between employment and housing should be cut permanently. Rents cannot be 
adjusted once and for all since inflation will continually tend to erode their real value. 
Furthermore, market rents cannot be decided by formulas. The report further 
recommended that given the historically high housing unit price-to-annual household 
income ratios, particularly in the larger cities, the construction of new housing should 
be overhauled. One reform suggested changing the composition of housing unit buyers, 
p.I 73-268 
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eliminating the work units and replacing them with rental management companies and 
individuals or co-operative investors purchasing rental and owner housing. These new 
buyers, having to operate in an environment where "hard" budget constraints would 
prevail, would help restore consumer sovereignty to the marketplace and force 
producers to adapt to demand or cease production. As far as housing finance was 
concerned, the report said that affordability, within the context of a viable financial 
intermediary system, could be advanced by accelerating moves toward lower down 
payments and longer repayment periods for mortgages 
In general, the report was practical, positive and fitted the situation in China at that time. 
It analysed accurately the housing system in China and proposed a systematic reform 
strategy, providing a foundation and reference for Chinese housing reform plans. 
However, there was great difficulty in putting this into operation mainly because the 
large wage subsidy required exceeded the means of enterprises and city finances. In 
addition, the report does not put forward practical advice for dealing with many 
problems. 
In Chinas Urban Housing Reform, Chinese and American scholars from the Institute of 
Finance and Trade Economics, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and the 
Institute of Public Administration, New York, USA put forward their view that although 
raising rents and selling public housing are an essential part of the reforms other issues 
were even more important. These included key issues such as the clarification and 
legalization of property rights, the creation of independent, non-profit housing 
14 The World Bank, China: Implementation Options for Urban Housing Reform, Washington, D.C., 1992 
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management companies, the development of effective housing finance, the formation 
of a market-based housing delivery system and rational price-setting mechanism. 15 
Up to 1996, all housing reform measures and experiments focused on rent increases and 
house sales. They lurched between emphasising one or other of these two methods. 
Whenever one was seen to have failed to produce the expected break-though, they 
moved towards the other. The limitations ofthis approach had become very clear and 
the work by these Chinese and American scholars is a good corrective. 
Monetisation of Housing Distribution, by Wang Xianqing and Wu Shaoping, studies in 
detail the background, significance, and standards of monetised housing provision. 16 
The book starts from in-kind provision under the planned system, follows the housing 
commercialisation process from system reform to monetised housing provision, 
monetised housing buying, the real estate market, house pricing and housing finance. It 
points out that the core of housing reform should be reform of the housing allocation 
system. Those who did well under this system saw no need to go to the market for 
housing, while those who did badly under the allocation system could not afford to buy 
or rent housing in the market. As a result, the housing income of those who had already 
been allocated housing was put into barik savings or spent on other goods while those 
who did not have housing could not afford to obtain it in the market. The housing in 
kind allocation system had become an obstacle to housing commercialisation and was 
15 Zhongguo shehui kexuyuan caimao jingji yanjiusuo and Meiguo niuyue gonggong guanli yanjiusuo 
Zhongguo Cheng=hen Zhu=hai Zhidu Gaige (China's Urban Housing Reform) Beijing: Jingji Guanli 
Chubanshe, 1996 
16 Wang, Xianqing and Wu, Shaoping, Huobi Fetifang (Monetisation Housing Distriblllion), Beijing: 
Gaige Chubanshe 1998 
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affecting the development of a real estate market. 
During the housing reform process, the emphasis shifted to raising funds for housing 
reform, changing the housing ownership structure by selling housing and resolving the 
question of allocation. Reform ofthe allocation system is the key. lfthis is resolved and 
people are paid the market wage rate, they will plan their housing consumption 
according to their personal circumstances· Gust like they plan their consumption of 
colour TV s, refrigerators and so on). There is no need for the government to interfere. If 
the emphasis is to be placed on changing the ownership structure, resolving the 
allocation system should be the underlying principle; otherwise, the change of 
ownership will lead to inequitable ownership of what were originally public resources. 
On the issue of government involvement in the housing market, many people think that 
the solution to the shortage of housing is for the government to step into the housing 
supply market, i.e. supply more Economic and Practical Housing. Hou Xinmin and 
other scholars think that there is big problem in housing supply in Chinese cities and 
towns, where the ratio of commercialized housing is too high and the ratio of Economic 
and Practical Housing is too low. On the basis of an investigation into residents' budget 
constraints, they draw the conclusion that because most people cannot afford the high 
price of the commercialized housing it should only be aimed at those who have a high 
income. Meanwhile, more Economic and Practical Housing should be built and be at 
the core of the housing supply system in order to solve the housing problems of 
mid-income and low-income families (approximately 70 percent of the total population, 
22 
they estimated) 17 • They suggest this should be a long-term policy. At present the 
government and many experts hold this view. While Zheng Yefu has doubts, he agrees 
that social security should assist people in greatest difficulty while those in the 
middle-income group should rely on the open market. He points out the contradictions 
in government policy: the government sells housing to those who already have it at the 
standard price, but then sells the Economic and Practical Housing to those in middle or 
low-income group at cost price. However, the cost price is much higher than the 
standard price and carries no security. 18 Ren Zhiqiang, taking the side ofthe real estate 
developers, thinks that Economic and Practical Housing, subsidised under government 
policy, will inevitably undermine commodity housing. The latter pays land rents and 
taxes. This causes unfair competition and affects the orderly operation of the market. 
He thinks that subsidies should be aimed at the market instead of at individuals. 19 A 
third point of view is put forward by Cheng Siwei. He thinks that Economic and 
Practical Housing should be in the short term promoted on a large scale but later 
transformed into commodity housing.20 Zheng Yefu and Ren Ziqiang's opinions seem 
most persuasive. The so-called 'new housing supply system' advocates that 
17 Hou, Ximin Ying, Hong and Zhang, Yaping Weiyou Guangsha QianwanJian(For Owning Thousands 
Great Houses) Guilin: Guangxi Shifan Daxue Chubanshe 1999, pp.153-155 
18 Zheng, Yefu, "Chengzhen zhufang zhidu gaige de sikao (xu)" (A Thought on Urban House System 
Reform(continued) ), in Beijing Fangdichan (Beijing Real Estate),Vol. 3, 1997, pp. 13 
19 Ren, Zhiqiang, "Fangdichan Kaifa zhong de Lilun he Zhengce" (The Theory and Policy in Real 
Estate Development) in Kan, Jun eds. Beijing Fangdichan Shichan-Toushi yu Fenxi(Perspective 
and Analysis-Beijing Real Estate Market Year Book) Beijing: Zhongguo Renshi Chubanshe 1998, 
pp.ll2-115 
2° Cheng, Siwei Zhongguo Cheng=hen Zhufang Zhidu Gaige-Mubiao Moshi yu shishi Nandian (Chinese 
Urban Housing System Reform-Objective Pattern and Implementation Difficulties), Beijing: Minzhu 
yu Jianshe Chubanshe, p.42 
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high-income families should buy commercialized housing, that middle-income families 
should buy Economic and Practical Housing and low-income families should rent low 
cost housing (lianzu fang). This uses administrative measures to divide the market into 
different sectors. It goes against market concepts, and contradicts the basic reform aim 
that housing should be commercialized and socialized. The government's moves to 
supply more Economic and Practical Housing risked lowering the price of 
commercialized housing in the short term. But in the long term, its disadvantages 
exceeded its advantages. Once the market system is undermined, the cost of housing 
reform will be even greater. By developing a housing market, with the operation of 
market mechanisms, the problem ofhigh prices and high vacancy levels of commodity 
housing can be solved. Te government is wrong to suppress the commercialisation of 
housing, by developing Economic and Practical Housing and neglecting low-rent 
housing. Instead it should promote the commercialisation of housing in such a way that 
most people could afford to buy, and provide low-rent housing for a minority of people 
in urgent need. Economic and Practical Housing should be given lower priority. 
A Note On Statistical Data: 
The study draws on the statistics provided by government departments as well as data 
collected by scholars. The major sources of official statistics are the National Statistical 
Bureau, the Ministry of Construction, and National Real Estate Index office. The study 
also uses data collected by scholars, for example, statistics on monthly rents, the size of 
the accumulated fund, house prices, etc. Most of the figures provided by scholars seem 
24 
to be accurate and reliable. However, the official data provided by various government 
departments are not uniformly reliable. For example, while the Ministry of 
Construction figures on the ratio of private ownership of urban housing can be treated 
as reliable, the ministry's figures on the housing price and family income ratio seem to 
be underestimates. In general, it can be said that official statistics do give a picture that 
is close to reality, but they are not entirely accurate and reliable. 
25 
Clluaptell" 3 1I'he JHrmnsfing System Jl9~9-89 
3. 1. Introduction 
Reform of the housing sector was started in 1978 as a part of the Reform and Open 
Door policy launched under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping. 21 However, housing 
reforms from 1978 to the end of the 1980s was limited to an examination of the 
situation and trial efforts at reform, which were conducted only in a few selected places. 
No new housing system was systematically applied throughout the country even after 
more than ten years of experimental reforms. Thus, in housing the reforms of the 1990s 
were still reforms of the old housing system in place before 1978. 
This chapter will examine the foundations, characteristics and problems of the old 
housing system as it developed from 1949-78, and then provide an introduction to the 
early experimental reform attempts before 1990. 
3. 2. Evolution ofthe Housing System 
The development of housing policy and practice during the period 1949-1978 can be 
divided into the following three phases. 
21 Note: Housing reform was initiated by a speech ofDeng Xiaoping on how to solve the problem of 
housing shortage in 1978. For further details, please see Wang, Wei Zhufang Zhidu Gaige Beijing: 
Zhongguo Renmin Daxue Chubanshe, 1999, p.218 
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3. 2. 1. From 1949 to 1952: Establishment of Public Ownership Principles 
The history of Chinese public ownership of urban housing can be traced back to the 
early days ofthe People's Republic of China. 
From 1949, eager to gain the population's trust by demonstrating its concern and 
efficiency, the new Chinese government needed to tackle a lot of issues it had not 
previously confronted, and immediately launched a series of programmes to 
reconstruct and re-organize the country. On the housing question, it began with a series 
of measures to deal with properties owned by the Guomindang authorities, bureaucrats, 
traitors to China, capitalists, landlords and foreigners. 1. Properties abandoned by the 
Guomindang authorities and bureaucratic capitalists such as "the Four Big Families" 
(sida jiazu) Jiang, Song, Kong, Chen, and big landlords, who were all considered the 
enemies of the people were confiscated. 2. Properties abandoned by traitors who 
worked for the Japanese army (during the Anti-Japanese War 1937-1945) were also 
confiscated by the new government. 3. Foreigners' properties fell into three categories: 
foreign government property, foreign religious organization property and foreign 
individual properties. The new government expropriated the properties of foreign 
governments considered to be enemy states ofthe PRC. Others were to be administered 
by the new authority on behalf of their owners ifthey were not claimed by their original 
owners. 4. In order to maintain social stability, the new government strengthened the 
policy of protecting private property including that of national capitalists, small 
handicraft enterprise owners and ordinary residents.22 
22 Yu, Siyuan Fangdichan Zhufang Gaige Yun=uo Quanslm Beijing: Zhongguo Jiancai Gongye 
27 
According to the statistics of the First Property Registration conducted by the Clearance 
Administration Bureau and Housing Administration Bureau in 1950 and 1951, through 
confiscation, new China turned I 0-15% of urban real estate property into the first batch 
of public housing. This belonged to the socialist government and set a foundation for 
the public ownership ofland and housing in urban areas?3 As the article "On the Nature 
and Policy of Urban Housing and Rent" (Guanyu chengshi fangwu fangzu de xingzhi 
he zhengce) published in People's Daily in December 1949 said: 
"The ownership of this kind of housing lies with the people's government, 
and belongs to the people. And more exactly, it is public property with 
socialist characteristic of the people with the working class as its leader, and 
with the unity of workers and peasants as its basis ..... All urban housing 
should be regarded as social property and protected···".24 
This clearly shows the public ownership orientation ofthe CCP's housing policy. Soon 
after the nationalization of housing, the new government introduced the equalization of 
housing in the early 1950s. Housing confiscated by the state was distributed among the 
population, including government employees, the army, and ordinary residents. In 
practice, the principle of "Using rental incomes to cover housing maintenance costs" 
was adopted. 25 In accordance with the regulations of that time, the monthly rent 
including the cost of depreciation, repairs, and administration was about 0.25 yuan per 
square meter. This accounted for 6-10% of a monthly family income. 26 It was stipulated 
Chubanshe 1998, pp.294-296; Wang, Xianqing and Wu, Shaoping Huobi Fenfang Beijing: Gaige 
Chubanshe 1998, pp.30-31 
23 Notes of lecture given by Professor Zhang, Xuebin, Beijing Real Estate Staff University 
24 For further details. please see Chen Zuoji, Wu Jie, Liu Zhifeng Zhongguo Zhufang Zhidu Gaige 
Beijing: Gaige Chubanshe 1996, p.608 
25 ibid p.608 
26 ibid p.607 
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in "On the Nature and Policy of Urban Housing and Rent" formulated by Ministry of 
Internal Affairs in 1952, that: 
" In order to save housing and use rental incomes to cover maintenance 
costs, a rental system is adopted .... On the one hand, (a rental system) can 
limit housing waste; on the other hand, (it) can help to maintain and build 
houses. A rational rental standard should cover the costs of depreciation, 
repairs and administration, real estate tax and a certain amount of interest. 
However, affordability must be considered a part of rent collection." 27 
3. 2. 2. From 1953 to 1958: Transformation to Public Ownership Housing System 
In 1953, China introduced its First Five-year Plan (Yiwu jihua). In 1956, China started 
the socialist transformation movement, which aimed at turning private industry and 
commercial trade into collectively owned and state-run enterprises. In this great 
changeover to a socialist structure, the private ownership of land and housing was 
transformed into public ownership through redemption, leasing, and private-public 
joint management. By 1958, most of the private owners had given up their property 
rights, although some of them still possessed or occupied some of the private housing 
for personal use according to the relevant regulations. 28 
During this period, the principle of"using rental incomes to cover housing maintenance 
costs" had not been rigorously implemented due to the unilateral emphasis on the 
welfare aspects of housing. Rents of urban public housing were gradually reduced 
around the country, and in most big cities, monthly rents went down from 0.25 yuan per 
27 ibid p.607 
28 Zhongguo shehui kexuyuan caimao jingji yanjiusuo and Meiguo niuyue gonggong guanli yanjiusuo 
Zhongguo Cheng:::hen Zhufang Zhidu Gaige Beijing: Jingji Guanli Chubanshe 1996, p.94; Hou, Ximin 
Ying, Hong and Zhang, Yaping Weiyou Guangsha Qianwanjian Guangxi: Guangxi Shifan Daxue 
Chubanshe, 1999, p. 10 
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square meter in the early 1950's to about 0.13 yuan per square meter.29 
3. 2. 3 From 1958 to 1978: Development of the Traditional Housing System 
During the period from 1958 to 1978, Chinese people experienced a series of political 
movements- the Great Leap Forward (Da yuejin), the People's Communes (Renmin 
Gongshe), and finally the Cultural Revolution (Wenhua da geming). Influenced by the 
policy of "the greater the public ownership element, the better the socialist system" 
(Gongyouzhi chenfen yueda yuehao), and, misled by the incorrect assumption that 
"communism is imminent", many leftist policies were implemented in the housing 
sector, reflecting similar changes being introduced to every aspect of life at the time. 
Public ownership became the major form of urban housing, with a negligible amount of 
private ownership of housing. Under various political and economic pressures, many 
private homeowners handed over their properties to the government "voluntarily" or 
involuntarily. All these properties automatically became public assets, although there 
were no definite government provisions on confiscation of such property rights. The 
government had become the only investor in and producer of urban housing. By 1978, 
74.8% of urban hous!ng was publicly owned.30 
29 Hou, Ximin Ying, Hong and Zhang, Yaping Weiyou Guangsha Qianwan Jian Guilin: Guangxi Shifan 
Daxue Chubanshe 1999, pp. 11-12; Chen Zuoji, Wu Jie, Liu Zhifeng Zhongguo Zhufang Zhidu Gaige 
Beijing: Gaige Chubanshe 1996, p.608 
3° Kong, Zhu "Zhongguo chengzhen zhufang zhidu gaige 1ilun zhengce yu shijian de fazhan" in Beijing 
Fangdichan Vol. 10, 1996, pp. 18-20; Zhongguo shehui kexuyuan caimao jingji yanjiusuo and Meiguo 
niuyue gonggong guanli yanjiusuo Zhongguo Chengzhen Zhufang Zhidu Gaige Beijing: Jingji Guanli 
Chubanshe 1996, p.95 
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3. 3. Characteristics and Problems ofthe Traditional Housing System 
3. 3. I. Characteristics 
The old Chinese housing system has been summarized as: a " welfare in kind 
distribution system" (shiwu fuli fenpei zhi), a "housing supply system" (zhufang 
gonggi zhi), a "housing welfare distribution system" (zhufang fuli fenpei zhi), a 
" low-rent-and-free-distribution system " (di zujin wuchang fenpei zhi), and 
"state-monopoly welfare system" (guoj ia baofuli zhi), etc. 31 Just like the traditional 
socialist economic system, it was a supply-driven system. Under the traditional 
socialist economic system, decision-making power was highly centralized. The 
government dictated to enterprises what to produce and how much to produce; and to 
people what to const!me and how much to consume. In such a supply-driven system, 
there was no concept of real demand; production meant consumption, while supply was 
equal to demand. Consumption demand was totally decided by production supply. The 
national housing situation in China, depended on the government's housing investment 
decisions. Under this housing system, instead of being circulated in a market, housing 
was distributed to employees by their work units in the name of welfare in kind, as a 
form of wage. Normally, welfare housing was distributed in direct relation to an 
employees' work ranking. 
Since housing, as a form of labour compensation, was linked to employment, 
employees had to obtain this welfare through their work units. However, some work 
31 Yang, Lu and Wang, Yukun Zhufang Gaige: Lilun de Fansi yu Xianshi de Xuan=he Tianjin: Tianjin 
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units obtained substantial housing investment from the government, while others were 
allocated little or nothing. The level of housing welfare an individual could obtain, not 
only depended upon their position in the work unit, but also upon the status of the work 
unit in the perception of government policy-makers.32 
The former housing system included characteristics appropriate to the " work 
unit-welfare in kind housing supply system" (danwei fuli gongji tizhi). Research has 
shown that these characteristics were fully manifested in the field of housing 
investment and housing distribution. 
I. Housing Investment 
Under the former system, housing investment mainly came from public funds. Usually, 
funds were allocated for housing investment after the government had chosen suitable 
capital construction projects Uijian xiangmu). Such projects were awarded to work 
units such as state-owned enterprises or large collective enterprises. Capital 
construction investment became the main source of housing investment. Depreciation 
and renewal funds were strictly managed. Those officials who used such funds for 
housing investment without permission were liable to be removed from office on the 
grounds of violating financial discipline. Therefore, the scale of housing investment 
directly depended on government decision-makers. Reinforced by the leftist notion of 
"production first, enjoyment later" (xian shengchan, hou shenghuo), before the reform 
movement decision-makers opted for more investment in production and less in 
Renmin Chubanshe 1992 , p. 69 
32 Zhongguo shehui kexuyuan caimao jingji yanjiusuo and Meiguo niuyue gonggong guanli yanjiusuo 
Zhongguo Cheng:hen Zhufang Zhidu Gaige Beijing: Jingji Guanli Chubanshe, 1996, pp.84-85 
32 
housing, which was regarded as "nonproductive investment".33 During the two periods 
of relatively normal economic construction (1953-1957 and 1971-1975), the annual 
housing investment was 1080 million yuan and 2010 million yuan respectively. 34 
Compared with the international average, the lack of Chinese investment in housing 
before the reform movement is clear (See Table 3 .I). 
Table 3.1 Chinese Housing Investment before 1978 and the International Average 
Housing Annual additional housing Residential housing 
investment as space per urban resident as % of all 
%of GNP construction 
International 3%-6% 0.5-1.0 sq. meter 50%-80% 
average 
China 0.75% 0.22 sq. meter 32.8% 
( 1952-1978) 
Source: Guojia Kewei , "Zhongguo jishu zhengce (zhuzai jianshe)" in Guojia Kewei 
Lanpishu, Vol. 2, 1985, pp.41-48 
During the 27 years from 1952 to 1978, China's total housing investment was 34,833 
million RMB, which was only 0. 75% of GNP for that period. According to UN 
statistics, housing investment was 3-6% of GNP in other countries, with 5% as an ideal 
rate recommended by the UN. During the same period, total urban housing construction 
in China amounted to 530 million square meters, or 0.22 square meters per person per 
year, while it was 0.5-1.0 square meters per person in other countries. Residential 
33 Zheng, Lian " Housing Renewal in Beijing-Observation and Analysis", a thesis submitted to the 
Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, Mcgill University; also see Cheng, Siwei Zhongguo 
Cheng=hen Zhufang Zhidu Gaige-Mubiao Moshi yu Shishi Nandian Beijing: Minzu yu Jianshe 
Chubanshe 1999, p.104 
34 Yang, Lu and Wang, Yukun Zhufan Gaige: Lilun de Fansi yu Xianshi de Xuan=e Tianjin : Tianjin 
Renmin Chubanshe, p.71 
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housing was only one third of the total new construction, compared with a rate of 
around 70% in other countries. The policy of"production first and enjoyment later" led 
to a reduction in Chinese urban residential space from 4.5 sq.meters per person at the 
beginning of 1950s to 3.6sq. meters per person in 1978?5 
Housing investment by state-owned enterprises came from the national capital 
construction allocation. In turn, the national capital construction allocation came from 
the high ratio of national income held by the state. This originated in the high level of 
retentions from employees wages. 
The national public accumulation funds included housing investment, and the 
completed housing which had already been distributed to employees at a low rent. 
Employees' low wages greatly contributed to the national public accumulation fund, 
which was later transformed into housing investment. (see figure 3.1 ). 
Figure 3. 1 Housing Investment Flow in Former Housing System 
Housing investment 
Employees 
2. Housing Allocation 
Housing was allocated among enterprises and individuals. Allocation among 
35 Guojia Kewei, "Zhongguo jishu zhengce (zhuzai jianshe)" in Guojia Kewei Lanpishu, Vol. 2, 1985, 
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enterprises could be classified into "two types" and "three levels"."Two types" referred 
to enterprises which could receive investment and allocate housing, and enterprises 
which could not. State-owned enterprises could receive a state capital construction 
allocation, but other enterprises could not. There were "three levels" among 
state-owned enterprises and institutions: the high level, large and powerful ones at the 
top, the ordinary ones in the middle and the small ones at the bottom. The lower the 
level, the slighter the chance of obtaining housing investment. 
In enterprises that received investment, housing was allocated according to 
administrative rank, marriage, age, and period of work. Since housing was such a big 
item for every single family, corruption caused by the housing in kind allocation system 
was rife, since work units leaders could easily allocate houses to themselves or people 
close to them.36 
3. 3. 2 Main Problems 
I. The old housing system inherently discouraged enterprises from developing housing. 
In the former system, after enterprises had handed over their profits to the government, 
they could obtain investment funds from the state for housing construction. In this way, 
the enterprises often became the actual controllers of such housing. For the enterprises, 
although housing funds came from the government, the right of use (shiyong quan) lay 
with the enterprises, and as such, they were responsible for the management. Therefore, 
pp.41-48 
36 Zhongguo shehui kexuyuan caimao jingji yanjiusuo and Meiguo niuyue gonggong guanli yanjiusuo 
Zhongguo Cheng=hen Zhufang Zhidu Gaige Beijing: Jingji Guanli Chubanshe 1996, pp.84; 
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this housing naturally became a kind of enterprise property, which could be used to 
placate employees. Until 1979, over 90% of all housing investment was financed by 
central and local government, but only 25% of completed public housing was 
controlled directly by the government. Most public housing was controlled by different 
work units, especially state-owned enterprises and government administrative organs.37 
The enterprise ownership of housing was considered detrimental to their effective 
commercial management. In order to keep up with changes in the market, enterprises 
had to adjust their scale of operations and the nature of their products structure; they 
also had to choose locations for new plants and hire or fire employees when necessary. 
During these processes, additional labour may have to be employed or surplus labour 
may have to be relocated to other projects, enterprises or places. Enterprise ownership 
of housing often led to difficulties in providing housing to new employees.38 
Under the traditional Chinese lifelong employment system, the amount of housing 
relocation in urban areas was very low. According to the policy at that time, swapping 
housing39 was limited to a barter system, and excluded the possibility of monetary 
compensation. 
2. The traditional housing system was harmful to the development of the housing 
construction industry. 
Under the Commodity Economy (shangpin jingji)40, continual increases in housing 
37 Wang, Xianqing and Wu, Shaoping Huobi Fenjang Beijing: Gaige Chubanshe, 1998,p.17: Yu, Siyuan 
Fangdichan Zhufang Gaige Yun=uo Quanshu Beijing: Zhongguo Jiancai Gongye Chubanshe 1998, p304 
38 Wang, Xianqing Zhufang Geming Guangdong: Guangdong Renmin Chubanshe, 1998, p. 9 
39 This was the only housing exchanging system in the absence of a true market. 
40 In the process of changing from a Planned Economy to a Market Economy with Socialist Characteristics, China 
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demand lead to house price increases, and thus to a growth in its supply. But in the 
low-rent system, rent did not reflect the value of the housing, and this led to a sluggish 
property development environment. 
According to the Theory of Replacement, in order to ensure simple replacement, 
consumed value and material objects must be compensated for year by year. This means 
recovering consumed funds through depreciation charges and other costs, and replacing 
capital goods and consumer goods. Under the old housing system, housing investment 
relied on government allocation, housing rents received government subsidy, and 
housing maintenance relied on local finance. The construction industry lacked the 
ability to carry out simple replacement, let alone extended replacement. Construction 
companies were not able to recover their costs for centuries, much longer than the 
service I ife of housing of normally below 1 00 years. Well before costs were recovered 
housing was declared obsolete. The deficit could only be made up by continuous input 
of government funds. The more housing that was built, the greater the annual 
government compensation figure. This phenomenon was described variously as "all 
input and no output", "he who builds loses" and "the more one builds, the greater the 
losses and the heavier the burden".41 
Relying completely on government assistance, the housing industry lacked a 
productive investment environment. Instead of becoming profitable, the housing 
construction industry became increasingly dependent on the government. 
The productivity of the housing construction industry also affects the development of 
introduced a commoditis&tion of the economy, which was called "Commodity Economy". 
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related industries. The housing construction industry is an amalgam of various 
industries such as the construction materials industry, the iron and steel industry, the 
engineering industry, and industries related to housing services and public utility supply 
and construction. The under-development of the construction industry hampers the 
development of other industries related to it.42 
3. Exacerbation of Unfair Income Distribution by the Housing Subsidy 
Before economic reforms, the characteristics of the Chinese urban wage system 
included low wages, welfare in kind packages and a wide-ranging rationing system for 
basic consumer goods. Wages were just part of people's incomes; the other part 
consisted of subsidies and income in kind. In 1988, housing subsidy was 16% of an 
employee's total annual income. It is clear that housing subsidy accounted for a 
considerable part ofwages.43 
However, not everyone received such large payments in kind. Various factors led to 
unequal rights and interests in housing allocation. Different sizes, ages, locations, 
fixtures and fittings of houses had different values. Allocation of housing of different 
value to residents meant that they received unequal "payments" and unequal housing 
subsidy. Under the old system, even a more just housing allocation procedure and more 
criteria would have been unlikely to satisfy people. The fact that housing was regarded 
as public property to be distributed fairly, while at the same time being considered a 
kind of wage to be distributed according to status was a central contradiction of the 
41 Wang, Xianqing and Wu, Shaoping Huobi Fenfang Beijing: Gaige Chubanshe, 1998, p. 18 
42 Wang, Xiaoguang Gao, Guoli and Fan,Caiyao Zhufang 7izhi Gaige Guangdong: Guangdong Jingji 
Chubanshe 1999, pp. 41-42 
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former housing system. Getting a new house amounted to receiving a big increase in 
non-monetary pay. At that time, the quest for ever better housing became a 
characteristic Chinese social aspiration along the quest for promotion. These factors 
caused housing allocation to aggravate the inequalities in income distribution. 
4.The traditional hou3ing system caused abnormal housing consumption 
In many countries, it is very common for individuals to build or buy their own housing. 
Since the World War 11, a strong wave of housing privatization has been witnessed in 
the USA, Japan, Australia and some other countries in Western Europe. In 1947, there 
were 20 million American families who had private housing. It constituted 53% of the 
total number of families. By the end of 1970s, 50% of British families owned private 
housing. By 1978, about 60% of Japanese families lived in their privately owned 
housing. By 1985, 63% of American, 60% of Canadian and 45% of French families 
lived in their own private housing.44 
Construction or purchase of housing through investment by the individual not only 
lightens the burden on government and accumulates wealth for society, but it also raises 
the value oftotal family capital. Another advantage of private investment in housing is 
that unrealistic housing expectations can be effectively managed. To build or buy a 
particular kind of housing, people must first consider the means at their disposal. 
In the former Chinese housing system, urban residents took little part in housing 
investment. In the middle of 1950s very limited individual housing investment (less 
43 Wang, Xianqing and Wu, Shaoping Huobi Fenfang Beijing: Gaige Chubanshe, 1998, p.19 
44 Yu, Siyuan Fangdichan Zhufang Gaige Yun=uo Quanshu Beijing: Zhongguo Jiancai Gongye 
Chubanshe, 1998, p305; Zheng, Yefu "Chengzhen zhufang zhidu gaige de sikao" in Beijing Real Estate, 
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than I% of the total) was made in certain special departments (industrial departments, 
such as railway, coal and textile) in some cities. During the Cultural Revolution, private 
investment disappeared totally and housing was always "rented not bought".45 
Taking into account both economic and political factors, it can be said that limited 
individual housing investment was inherent in the old housing system. Tenants could 
enjoy leasehold-type rights, by paying as little as 2% of their monthly family 
expenses.46 Nobody wanted to surrender such low cost housing simply for the sake of 
more extensive property rights. For owners, the disposal rights pertaining to housing 
were beset by various limitations. It was uncertain whether house-owners could achieve 
sufficient return on capital when they resold property, making private investment in 
housing unattractive. In nay case, the cost of housing was beyond the means of the vast 
majority of the population. The ratio between average cost of a house and the average 
urban resident's annual income was over 20 to 1, while it ranged between 2: I and 6: I 
in other countries. Finally, without a system of credit buying, housing could not attract 
consumer investment. For all these reasons, Chinese urban residents were neither 
willing to nor able to build or buy their own housing. "To rent" but not "to buy" became 
the norm. 
Vol. 2, 1997, p.12 
45 Liao, Kangyu "Zhongguo touzi tizhi gaige yu zhongguo chengzhen zhufang fazhan" (The Reform of 
Housing Investment System & Housing Development in China) in Zhongguo Cheng:::hen Zhu:::hai Zhidu 
Gaige Beijing: Jingji Guanli Chubanshe, 1996, pp.208-209 
46 Hou, Ximin Ying, Hong and Zhang, Yaping Weiyou Guangsha Qianwan Jian Guilin: Guangxi Shifan 
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3. 4 Experimental Reform Period: 1978 to the late 1980s 
The old housing system was first attacked during the wave of reforms at the end of the 
70s. The Third Plenary Session of the Chinese Communist Party's Eleventh Central 
Committee (shiyi jie sanzhong quanhui) in 1978, initiated policies which ended the old 
era and heralded a new phase of development in China. Deng Xiaoping launched a 
large-scale reform movement throughout the country, which covered virtually all 
aspects of people's lives, including the housing sector. 
At the end of the 1970s, housing shortages were a pressing problem in most cities in 
China. 47 Under the new policies, all work-units were given autonomy in housing 
investment and development. Due to a shortage of government funds, they were given 
the responsibility for raising funds for construction,. After that, a series of new 
experimental housing policies were introduced. These eventually brought about 
tremendous changes in urban daily life in the 1990s. 
Experimental housing reform before 1990 went through the following stages.48 
1.From 1978 to 1985, the policy of selling public housing was adopted in some places 
across the country. In 1978, the central government's resolve to bring private initiatives 
to full play in solving urban housing problems was evident during the National Urban 
Housing Working Conference. Deng Xiaoping suggested in 1980 that "Urban residents 
can buy their own housing or build their own housing; not only new but also old 
Daxue Chubanshe, 1999, p. 31 
47 Hou, Xi m in Ying, Hong and Zhang, Yaping Weiyou Guangsha Qianwan Jian Guilin: Guangxi Shifan 
Daxue Chubanshe, 1999, p.19 
48 Cheng, Siwei Zhongguo Cheng=hen Zhufang Zhidu Gaige-Mubiao M os hi yu Shishi Nandian Beijing: 
Minzu yu Jianshe Chubanshe 1999, pp. 111-125; Yang, Lu and Wang, Yukun Zhufan Gaige: Lilun de 
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housing can be sold; housing payment can be made in one go or by installments, say 
over I 0 or 15 years".49 In 1979, new housing apartments were sold by local government 
to private owners in the cities of Xian, Liuzhou, Wuzhou, and Nanning at a "full price" 
which covered all construction costs. The same practice was introduced to fifty other 
experimental cities such as Guilin, Shenyang, Wuxi, Nanjing, etc. in 1980. In April 
1982, the State Council issued regulations allowing subsidies in housing for sale in the 
four experimental cities of Changzhou, Zhengzhou, Si ping and Shashi. Selling public 
housing with subsidies meant that housing was sold at cost price50 to employees, with 
subsidies provided by government and work units. In principle, the government, work 
units and individuals paid one third of the cost respectively. It was called "three-three 
housing selling system" (sansan zhi). In October, 1984, the State Council released the 
Report on Expanding the Experimental Sites for Urban Public Housing Sales with 
Subsidies (Guanyu Kuoda Chengshi Gongyou Zhuzhai Butie Chushou Shidian de 
Baogao), prepared by the Ministry of National Construction. 51 This led to the 
designation ofBeijing, Shanghai and Tianjin as new experimental cities. By the end of 
1985, more than 10 million square meter of public housing had been sold.52 
It has been argued that these experiments, as a major part of the pre-1990 housing 
reforms, were not motivated by a desire to establish a market-oriented housing supply 
Fansi yu Xianshi de Xuanze Tianjin : Tianjin Renmin Chubanshe 1992, pp. 5-7 
49 Lu, Fuxin Zhongguo Fanggai Toushi Hangzhou: Hangzhou Daxue Chubanshe 1993, p.9 
50 Under the old planned housing system, the land was not considered to be a cost at that time. 
51 Zhang, Zuoji Wu, Jie and Liu, Zhifeng Zhongguo Zhufang Zhidu Gaige Beijing: Gaige Chubanshe 
1996 pp.113-115 
52 Guo, Jianbo and Liu, Hongyu Fangdichan Jingying Guanli Baikequanshu (Vol. 4) Beijing: Renmin 
Zhongguo Chubanshe, 1999, p.2404; Zhang, Zuoji Wu, Jie and Liu, Zhifeng Zhongguo Zhufang Zhidu 
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system. Rather they were motivated by "short-term factors", such as the need for a 
quick return on investment, since government investment and funds raised by the 
various work units could not meet the demand for new housing, which was growing 
rapidly in the 1980s. 53 Moreover, with no fundamental change in the low rent policy, 
the increase in housing investment and supply could only be met by an increase in 
subsidies, which caused an added burden for the government and enterprises. 
Under this policy, housing units were offered to employees at a standard price 
(biaojunj ia), which was first set at 50 percent of total construction cost. Later it was 
decided that the government, work units and individuals would each pay part of the 
price. The standard price was set at 300 yuan per sq. meter at that time, while in practice, 
the average sale price nationwide was around 20 yuan per sq. meter. In 1985, the State 
Council withdrew its approval of the preferential sale system for public housing, owing 
to widespread criticism ofthe policy.54 
2. From 1986 to the first half of 1988, a "basket" of housing reform measures, including 
rent increases and promotion of home ownership, were experimented with in the cities 
ofYantai (Shandong province), Tangsan (Hebei) and Bengbu (Anhui). The significance 
Gaig Beijing: Gaige Chubanshe, 1996, pp.608-609 
53 Wang, Yukun "Cong gongfang chushou de shiyian kan zhufang gaige zhanlue de xuanzhe" in Jingji 
Li/unyuJingji Guanli, Vol. 4 1986, p.l5; Zhongguo shehui kexuyuan caimaojingji yanjiusuo and 
Meiguo niuyue gonggong guanli yanjiusuo Zhongguo Cheng::hen Zhufang Zhidu Gaige Beijing: Jingji 
Guanli Chubanshe 1996, piS; Zhang, Zhongjun "Zhongguo chengzhen zhufang zhidu gaige de shijian 
he tansuo" in Gao, Shangquan and Chu, Chuanheng eds. Zhongguo Cheng=hen Zhufang Zhidu Gaige 
Quanshu Beijing: Zhongguo Jihua Chubanshe 1996, pp.36-38 
54 Chen, Zhixiang "Dangqian woguo zhuzhaiye de gaige daolu yu fazhan moshi" in Zhu=hai yu 
Fangdichan (Housing and Real Estate), Vol. 3, 1997, pp.44-46; Zhongguo shehui kexuyuan caimao 
jingji yanjiusuo and Meiguo niuyue gonggong guanli yanjiusuo Zhongguo Cheng::hen Zhufang Zhidu 
Gaige Beijing: Jingji Guanli Chubanshe 1996, p87 
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of these experiments lies in the fact that they directly attacked the low rent system, one 
of the main defects of the old housing system. Following these experiments, the first 
National Conference on Urban Housing Reform was held in early 1988, and the 
Implementation Provisions on Housing Reform in Urban Areas (Guanyu zai quanguo 
chengzhen fenqi fenpi tuixing zhufang zhidu gaige shishi fang'an) was issued by the 
Housing Reform Leadership Group under the State Council (Guowuyuan fanggai 
lingdao xiaozu), which provided detailed guidelines for housing reform with rent 
increases as its main component. 
The immediate and main obstacle to rent reform was the capacity of households to pay 
higher rents. As stipulated in the Provisions, the payment of increased rents would 
come mainly from two sources. One was household income, which meant households 
would devote a substantially larger proportion of their income to housing, with no 
obvious benefits. The other was an upward wage adjustment, which reflected the fact 
that the arbitrarily determined low wages were recognised as an underlying cause of 
low rents. This was to be corrected gradually through an adjustment to national income 
distribution. 55 
Contrary to the aim of the Provisions, the rent increases failed to raise substantially the 
proportion of household income devoted to housing. Furthermore, it led to pressure for 
wage increases to meet the higher rents. This in turn led to an increased burden on the 
government and on enterprises. Constrained by the budget limitations, rent increases 
55Guanyu zai quanguo chengzhen fenqi fenpi tuixing zhufang zhidu gaige shishi fangan, Document No. 
ll, Guofa (1988), promulgated by the Leadership Group in charge of Housing Reform under the State 
Council in 1988, Simplified as the Provisions hereafter, in Gao, Shangquan and Chu, Cuanheng eds. The 
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compensated for by wage adjustments turned out to be an empty theory with no 
practical benefits. 
In view of the disappointing progress ofthe rent reform experiment, the sale of existing 
public housing stocks re-emerged as the main component of housing reform after 1989. 
Similar to the situation in the early 1980s, the strategy of selling public housing was 
geared less towards establishing a market-based housing system than towards 
extracting more resources from households, in the form of housing investment, 
maintenance and management costs. Following this strategy, various experiments in 
house sales were conducted all over the country. Due to a lack of technical skill in 
property appraisal and management, an irrational rent-sale price ratio, and the unclear 
role of house sales in the overall housing strategy, many housing units were sold at 
hugely discounted prices. These prices amounted to less than 15 percent of the 
d . 56 pro uctton cost. 
Although the housing reforms during the experimental stage before 1990 did not 
produce any great achievements in practice, they did bring about a change in the 
thinking of the Chinese people, and made everyone realise that housing too was a kind 
of commodity. The lessons learnt during this period were beneficial for the much more 
comprehensive reforms that followed in the 1990s. 
Compendium of China's Urban Housing System Reform Zhongguo Jihua Chubanshe, 1996, pp. 783-786 
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Chapter 41 Key Housing Reform Measures of tlh.e 1990s 
4. I Introduction 
Towards the end of the 1980s, such economic conditions as chronic inflation, weak 
market demand, shortage of funds, and declining enterprise profits jeopardised the 
implementation of the housing system reform that the State Council had developed 
based on the experiments in Yantai, Tangshan and Bengbu. The whole housing system 
reform was halted. 57 
In 1991, when the Consolidation and Reorganisation Programme58 was drawing to an 
end, and the economy began to recover, the State Council launched a fresh initiative 
with a series of measures designed to push forward urban housing reform. It can be said 
that 1991 was a landmark year in the history of housing system reform in China. The 
year was characterised by following developments. 
In March, the State Council reorganized the Steering Group in Charge of Housing 
Reform under the State Council and moved it from under the Ministry of Construction 
to the National Reform Committee (Tigaiwei). Housing system reform was declared to 
be one of the three most important reform programmes under the National Reform 
Committee.59 On the l 51 ofMay, the Scheme for Implementing Urban Housing Reform 
56 Wang, Wei Zhufang Zhidu Gaige Beijing: Zhongguo Renmin Daxue Chubanshe, 1999, pp. 223-230 
57 For more details, please see Cheng, Siwei Zhongguo Chengzhen Zhufang Zhidu Gaige-Mubiao 
Moshi yu Shishi Nandian Beijing: Minzu yu Jianshe Chubanshe 1999, pp. 118-125 
58 Yu, Siyuan Fangdichan Zhufang Gaige Yun::uo Quanshu Beijing: Zhongguo Jiancai Gongye 
Chubanshe 1998, p340 
59 Gao, Shangquan and Chu, Cuanheng "1978 Nian zhi 1995 nian fanggai dashiji" in Zhongguo 
Cheng::hen Zhufang Zhidu Gaige Quanshu Beijing: Zhongguo Jihua Chubanshe 1996, pp.ll69-1175; 
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in Shanghai (Shanghaishi zhufang zhidu gaige shishi fang'an)60 was initiated. In June, 
the State Council issued the Notice on Actively Pushing Forward Urban Housing 
System Reform (Guowuyuan guanyu jixu jiji wentuo di jinxing chenzhen zhufang 
zhidu gaige de tongzhi). 61 On the ih of October, the State Council convened the Second 
National Conference on Urban Housing System Reform at which Prime Minister Li 
Peng made an important speech encouraging reform of the housing system. On the 13th 
of November, the Leadership Group in charge of Housing Reform under the State 
Council promulgated the Directive on Intensifying the Urban Housing Reform 
(Guanyu quanmian tuijin chenzhen zhufang zhidu gaige de yijian).62 
In order to deepen the housing reform, especially to push forward the proposed rent 
increases and other reform measures, the Third National Conference for Urban Housing 
Reform was held in December 1993. This re-targeted the sale of public housing as the 
"key measure". On the 18th of July 1994, the State Council issued The Decision on 
Intensifying Urban Housing System Reform (Guowuyuan guanyu shenhua chengzhen 
zhufang zhidu gaige de jueding)63 which pointed out that as a main plank of the 
Zhang, Zuoji Wu, Jie and Liu, Zhifeng "Zhongguo chengzhen zhufang zhidu gaige dashiji(1980-1996)" 
in Zhongguo Zhufang Zhidu Gaige Beijing: Gaige Chubanshe 1996, pp.622-625 
60 Approved on gth Feb. 1991 and was put into effect on 1't May 1991, in Zhang, Zuoji Wu, Jie and Liu, 
Zhifeng eds. Zhongguo Zhufang Zhidu Gaige Beijing: Gaige Chubanshe 1996, pp.202-210 
61 Document No. 30 of Guofa [ 1991] , Promulgated by the State Council on 7th June 1991, in Beijing 
Fangdichan Zhengce Fagui Huibian Beijing: Beijingshi Chengshi Jianshe Zonghe Bangongshi 1998, 
pp.415-418 
62 Document No.73 ofGuobanfa [ 1991] , promulgated by the Leadership Group in charge of Housing 
Reform under the State Council on , in Gao, Shangquan and Chu, Chuanheng eds. Zhongguo Cheng=hen 
Zhufang Zhidu Gaige Quanshu Beijing: Zhongguo Jihua Chubanshe 1996, pp.790-793 
63Document No.43 ofGuofa [ 1994] ,promulgated by the State Council on 18th July 1994, in Gao, 
Shangquan and Chu, Cuanheng eds. Zhongguo Cheng=hen Zhufang Zhidu Gaige Quanshu Beijing: 
Zhongguo Jihua Chubanshe 1996, pp.797-801 
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nation-wide economic reforms, the fundamental purpose of housing reform was to 
establish a new urban housing system which was suited to the socialist market economy, 
would achieve housing commercialisation, expedite residential construction, improve 
housing conditions and meet the increasing housing demands of urban residents. The 
document greatly promoted housing reform in the 90s. 
All these regulations and directives embodied four basic principles: cost sharing 
between the government, enterprises and individuals; encouraging the balanced 
development of both "market-oriented" rental systems and private ownership in order 
to mobilise more resources; decentralising the decision-making process in accordance 
with local conditions under the central guidance; and transforming the housing delivery 
system. These principles provided the basic framework for China's housing reform in 
the period to come. 
The above initiative showed that China's housing reform had stepped out of the 
tentative experimental stage to a new phase of all-out implementation with 
accompanying reforms in related sectors. 
The beginning of the 1990s was the turning point in the reform of China's economic 
system. From 1991, China adopted market-oriented reform after over ten years of 
experiments and practising. This contributed to a consensus over making the housing 
reforms more market oriented, so they encompassed a comprehensive set of reforms 
including rent increases (tigao zujin), sales of public housing (gongfang chushou), the 
creation of a Housing Accumulation Fund (Zhufang gongjijin), the promotion of 
Economical and Practical Housing (Jingji shiyongfang), etc. 
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4. 2. Public Housing Rent Reform (Gongfang zujin gaige) 
4. 2. 1. The Policy 
In October 1991, the State Council summoned the Second National Housing Reform 
Conference and issued two documents: the Notice and the Directive. It was proposed in 
these documents that the reforms should focus on raising rents in planned stages to 
make reasonable adjustments in the rents of public housing. In the early stages of 
housing reform, when the residents' financial ability to pay was still very limited, it was 
considered necessary to adopt a gradual approach to rent increases. It was decided that 
for newly built housing, the new rent system should be applied, and additional rent 
should be charged on additional units of housing occupied by employees. The 
documents also put forth ten-year objectives the long-term goals of housing reform. It 
was proposed that by the year 2000, the criterion for determining rents for public 
housing should be 'cost rent' (chengben zujin) comprising maintenance fee, 
management fee, depreciation fee, investment profits and property tax. In the long term, 
it should reach the level of commercial rents with land use charge, insurance premium 
d . dd" . fi 64 an , m a ttton, pro Its. 
64 For further details, please see "Guowuyuan Guanyu Jixu Jiji Wentuo di Jingxing Chenzhen Zhufang 
Zhidu Gaige de Tongzhi" ,Document No. 30 of Guofa [ 1991] , Promulgated on 71h June 1991, in 
Beijingshi Fangdichan Zhengce Fagui Huibian Beijing: Beijingshi Chengshi Jianshe Zonghe 
Bangongshi 1998, pp.415-418 and "Guanyu Quanmian Tuijin Chenzhen Zhufang Zhidu Gaige de 
Yijian" , Document No. 73 of Guobanfa [ 1991] , promulgated by the Leadership Group in charge of 
Housing Reform under the State Council, in Gao, Shangquan and Chu, Cuanheng eds. Zhongguo 
Cheng=hen Zhufang Zhidu Gaige Quanshu Beijing: Zhongguo Jihua Chubanshe 1996, pp.790-793 
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On the 181h of July, 1994, the State Council issued another document entitled the 
Decision, which clearly stipulated that: 
"housing rent should in principle reach 15% of the average family-income 
by the year 2000 ...... housing rent reform plans should be made and 
published accurately by every local government. The scope and frequency 
of rent increases should conform to the income level of the local residents 
and should be planned as a whole with reference to the price index. In 
provinces and counties with suitable conditions, the reforms should be 
aimed at achieving the goals of cost rent and market rent."65 
4. 2. 2. Philosophy 
For a long time, low rent remained the main feature of the urban housing system (see 
Table 2-1) and was a major reason behind various kinds of malpractices such as 
inproper (i.e. corrupt) disposal of public housing. 
Table 4.1 Public Housing Monthly Rent in Beijing before 1991 (unit: yuan I sq. meter) 
Year 1949 1950 1951 1958 1966 1979 1990 
Rent 0.3 0.21 0.34 0.22 0.24 0.136 0.136 
Source: Cheng, Siwei Zhongguo Chengzhen Zhufang Zhidu Gaige-Mubiao Moshi yu 
Shishi Nandian, 1999, p.203 
1.The low rent system divorced completely the cost of housing from its value. This 
made it impossible to recoup the value of housing through letting, and thereby resulted 
in a shortage of maintenance funds. Though additional funds were raised through local 
65 For further details, please see "Guowuyuan Guanyu Shenhua Chengzhen Zhufang Zhidu Gaige de 
Jueding" Document No.43 ofGuofa[ 1994] ,promulgated by the State Council on 181h July 1994, in Gao, 
Shangquan and Chu, Cuanheng eds. Zhongguo Cheng=hen Zhufang Zhidu Gaige Quanshu Beijing: 
Zhongguo Jihua Chubanshe 1996, pp.797-801 
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financing in some cities, it was too little to meet the need for maintenance investment. 
This led to the poor maintenance of urban housing, which became a safety hazard. Poor 
quality housing also adversely affected the enthusiasm of the employees, and thus their 
productivity. Without changing the low rent system, the problem of poor maintenance 
could not be solved, and thus the living conditions of the employees could not be 
improved. 
2. The low rent system ensured that housing costs as a percentage of total household 
costs was very low. To occupy more housing space caused very little extra economic 
burden for a family. This resulted in excessive demand for housing, and malpractice in 
housing distribution, contributing to the practice referred to as "unfair housing 
allocation, unequal comfort and discomfort". Therefore, without disposing of the low 
rent system, it was considered impossible to establish an economic mechanism to curb 
the occurrence of such practices. 
3. The low rent system constituted the main obstacle to the implementation of other 
housing policies. If the low rent system were not changed, it would be difficult to 
initiate other reform measures, for example the sale of public housing. Even if they 
could be initiated, it would be difficult to sustain them. It was commonly acknowledged 
that it was better to rent a residential apartment than buy one, because the rent was low 
while the price of an apartment was high. An apartment with one bedroom and one 
sitting room cost at least RMB I 0,000 in the early 1990s, but to rent such a dwelling cost 
only a few hundred yuan a year. However, if the money to buy an apartment was 
deposited in the bank, a year's fixed deposit could earn an interest of more than one 
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thousand yuan. So as a result, nobody was willing to buy housing.66 As this example 
shows, the low rent system greatly reduced people's enthusiasm to buy their own 
housing. 
4. The low rent system also affected the construction of new housing units. For a long 
time low rent alienated the returns on housing from its real value, making the returns 
not only lower than the value but even below cost. Thus housing funds experienced the 
phenomenon of "input with no output". So, not only was it impossible to expand 
provision, the rent was even not enough to maintain existing provision. Housing 
maintenance agencies found it difficult to maintain the housing with low rental revenue 
and had to depend on the state to subsidise their maintenance work. So the more 
housing that was built, the more maintenance funds the state had to provide, resulting in 
a vicious circle. Civil housing construction fell into a downward spiral, which had a 
seriously negative impact on the development of the construction materials industry 
and many other related industries. 
4. 2. 3 Obstacles to Housing Rent Reform 
There were various reasons for the slow progress of housing rent reform. These 
included opposition from the beneficiaries of the low rent system, as well as lack of will 
on the part of the government, resulting in a lack of effective measures. 
Rent increase would have greatly affected the interests of the residents of public 
66 Lu, Fuxin Zhongguo Fanggai Toushi, Zhejiang: Hangzhou Daxue Chubanshe, 1993, p4 
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housing. As housing expenditure did not form part of wages in the past, people were 
used to the idea of "low rent from low wages", and clung to low rents despite the 
increase in wages. But the housing reform strategy did not go in tandem with 
accompanying reforms in the wage system, which was correlated with reform of the 
financial system and the distribution system. This brought about a deadlock of no 
increase in rent without an increase in wages, even when there had already been an 
increase in wages. 
Also, local officials did not show keen interest in implementing rent increases. These 
would have been unpopular with most employees and thus ran the risk of generating 
social instability. All these factors made it virtually impossible to achieve what was 
stipulated in the Decision, namely that "rent should in principle reach 15% of the 
average family income by the year 2000".67 
Table 4-2 Public Housing Monthly Rent in Beijing in the 1990s (unit: RMB I sq. meter) 
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Rent 0.136 0.18 0.28 0.55 0.87 1.30 1.30 1.30 1.30 
Source: Cheng, Siwei Zhongguo Chengzhen Zhufang Zhidu Gaige-Mubiao Moshi yu 
Shishi Nandian, 1999, p.203 
67 Wang, Xianqing Zhufang Geming Guangdong: Guangdong Renmin Chubanshe 1998, pp 16-17; Shang, 
Junfeng Gaige de Kundian yu Xingfendian Guangdong: Zhuhai Chubanshe 1998, pp.133-138; Gu, 
Yunchang" Da fudu tizu youkeneng ma?'' in Zhongguo Fangdich, Vol.l, 1998, p.22-24; Xu, Man 
"Gongfang zujin weihe tiaojia" in Beijing Qingnian Bao 22"d March 2000; Zhang, Hongming, Zhuzhai 
Jingjixue, Shanghai: Shanghai Caijing Daxue Chubanshe, 1998, p. 374 
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One outcome of the slow progress of rent reform has been the prevalence of "public 
housing rented privately" (Gongfang sizu). Some residents were allocated (in fact 
rented) more than one flat (often illicitly), and then sub-let their spare flat at the market 
rent.68 There was a huge difference between the rental cost of public housing and the 
market rent. For example, in 1998, a 70-square-meter flat within the fourth ring road 
area in Beijing, had public housing rental cost of about RMB90 per month, but could be 
rented out for RMB2000 in the open market. If it was within the second ring road, it 
could be rented out for more than RMB3000, while the public housing rental charge 
was still RMB90. Due to such differences in rents, people were able to take advantage 
of the loopholes in the policy and make large profits out of low rent public housing.69 
4. 3. Sale of Public Housing (Gongfang chushou) 
4. 3. I. Policy 
The sale of public housing was one ofthe key constituents ofthe urban housing system 
reforms in China in the 90s. 
The two documents, the Notice and the Directive, spelled out the policy on the sale of 
public housing. Employees who bought public housing within the stipulated space 
range could benefit from standard price purchase (biaojun jia), which was lower than 
cost price. The buyer had partial property rights, including the right of possession, the 
68 Wang, Jin Ding, Weihua and Tian, Weihua "Beijingshi gongfang sizu wenti de sikao yu jianyi" in 
Beijing Fangdichan, Vol. 4, 1999, p. 30-33 
69 This account is based on the researcher's own experience as a resident ofBeijing 
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right of disposal, limited trading rights and the right to profit through rent. The housing 
could be inherited, and sold or rented out in the market after five years from the time of 
purchase. It was stipulated that the employee's work unit, which was the original owner 
of the property, should receive priority in buying or renting the property and the 
proceeds from sale of the property should be distributed according to the property rights 
ratio between the state, the work unit, and the resident, after the deduction oftax.70 
In December, 1993, the State Council called the Third National Housing Reform 
Conference, which decided on the approach of "selling public housing, together with 
promoting rent increases and the expansion of housing construction", in place of "rent 
increases, together with the promotion ofthe sale of public housing and the expansion 
of housing construction" passed at the Second National Housing Reform Conference in 
1991.71 On the 18th of July, 1994, the State Council issued the Decision. Both the 
Conference and the Document presented a unified approach to the problem of housing 
reform in the country, including the principles of selling public housing, the price 
calculation methods, the depreciation policy and the handling of property rights. 
According to the Decision, for families with a comfortable income, the market price 
(shichanjia) was to be applied in selling public housing.72 For middle or low-income 
7
° For further details, please see "Guowuyuan Guanyu Jixu Jiji Wentuo di Jingxing Chenzhen Zhufang 
Zhidu Gaige de Tongzhi" , Document No. 30 of Guofa [ 1991] , Promulgated on 71h June 1991, in 
BeijingFangdichan Zhengce Fagui Huibian Beijing: Beijingshi Chengshi Jianshe Zonghe Bangongshi 
1998, pp.4l5-418 and "Guanyu Quanmian Tuijin Chenzhen Zhufang Zhidu Gaige de Yijian", Document 
No.73 ofGuobanfa [ 1991] , promulgated by the Leadership Group in charge of Housing Reform under 
the State Council, in Gao, Shangquan and Chu, Cuanheng eds. Zhongguo Chengzhen Zhujang Zhidu 
Gaige Quanshu Beijing: Zhongguo Jihua Chubanshe 1996, pp.790-793 
71 Shang, Junfeng Gaige de Kundian yu Xingfendian Guangdong: Zhuhai Press 1998, pp.124-126 
72 Note: There has not been any practice of public housing's market price until now. 
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families, the cost price was to be applied. This included land cost, site clearance costs, 
architects fees, design and planning costs, construction and fitting out cost, provision of 
utilities, management fee, loan interest and tax. However, when it was not financially 
feasible to sell public housing to middle or low-income families at the cost price, the 
standard price could be applied during a transitional period. As far as property rights are 
concerned, purchasers who paid the market price for apartments enjoyed full property 
rights, which included the right to sell the apartment in the market, and keep all the 
proceeds after tax. This contrasted with cost price purchasers who could only sell 
apartments after five years. On selling and apartment, the vendors had to pay arrears of 
land lease and the specified tax. People who purchased housing at the standard price 
received only partial property rights (bufen chanquan), which included exclusive user 
rights (shiyongquan), but they were not allowed to sell the property for the stipulated 
five-year term. For housing under this last category, the original property rights holder 
enjoyed priority for purchase or rent if the work unit could match the open market price. 
If no original owners remained, the local government housing management department 
would acquire the purchase and rental rights. 73 
4. 3. 2. Philosophy 
According to statistics, by 1998, there were about 3500 million square meters of public 
housing whose rental income was not even enough to cover maintenance and 
73 For further details, please see "Guowuyuan Guanyu Shenhua Chengzhen Zhufang Zhidu Gaige de 
Jueding", Document No.43 of Guofa[ 1994 ],promulgated by the State Council on 181h July 1994, in Gao, 
Shangquan and Chu, Cuanheng eds. Zhongguo Cheng=hen Zhufang Zhidu Gaige Quanshu Beijing: 
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management costs. This forced the state and enterprises to invest around 10,000 million 
yuan to subsidise the maintenance and management costs of public housing every 
year. 74 So, the sale of public housing assumed great significance in the housing system 
reforms. 
Firstly, the sale of public housing was primarily aimed at expediting the recovery of the 
investment costs, and promoting housing construction. Rental and sale of housing are 
the two basic forms of commercial activity in the residential homes market. However, 
due to the different pace of investment cost recovery, their impact on housing 
construction is very different. For instance, in 1994, 240 million square meters of 
housing was constructed.75 If one-third was sold at RMB500 per square meter, RMB 40 
billion could be recovered to invest in new housing construction. But, if rental was 
charged at RMB 1 per square meter, the total annual recovered funds amounted to no 
more than RMB2880 million. As much ofthe rent was to be invested in management 
and maintenance, little was left for new construction. There were 3500 million square 
meters of public housing in the whole country by 1998, and calculated at RMB400 per 
square meter (the cost price of public housing in Beijing in 1997-9 was RMB 1450-1485 
per square meter) the value could reach RMB I ,400 billion. If a quarter of it could be 
sold, RMB350,000 million could be recovered. This in turn would be a significant sum 
to invest in new housing construction. 
Secondly, the sale of public housing could accelerate housing rent reforms. On the one 
Zhongguo Jihua Chubanshe 1996, pp.797-80l 
74 Gu, Yunchang" Da fudu tizu youdeneng ma?'' in Zhongguo Fangdichan Vol.J, 1998, p.22 
75 Wu, Huiqin Zhzchai Jianshe-Xin de Jingji Zeng=hang Dain, Beijing: Zhongguo Jiancai Gongye 
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hand, selling public housing to employees can quickly rationalise their housing 
expenditure; on the other hand it reduces the residential rental space, and thus reduces 
resistance to the housing rent reforms, which helps increase the dynamics of the 
reforms. 
Thirdly, the sale of public housing helps reduce the financial burden on the state and on 
enterprises. Until housing rents reach cost level, the state and enterprises can reduce 
their burden by selling housing. 
Finally, the sale of housing can promote the privatisation of housing. From the 60s and 
70s, some countries with market economy systems began to adjust their housing policy, 
by encouraging the private ownership of housing. By the 1990s, the privatisation of 
housing ownership had become a general global trend.76 The advantage of privatisation 
lies in the fact that it can reduce the burden on the state, and also, in the long-term, be 
beneficial for residents to buy rather than rent. As a latecomer to housing reform, China 
can learn a lot from international experience in the privatisation of housing. 
4. 3. 3 Problems 
I. Selling housing on favourable terms caused great losses to the housing reform fund. 
The administratively determined cost price was already far lower than the market price 
in the commercial housing market. For example, the administratively determined cost 
price of public housing announced by Beijing Housing Reform Office in 1997 was 
RMB 1450 per sq. meter, but the average market price of commodity housing was 
Chubanshe, p. 28 
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RMB4000 per sq. meter. As the location of the property did not make any difference in 
determining the price of the housing, public housing located within the 
Third Ring Road in Beijing was uniformly priced at RMB 1450 (see Table 2-3), but the 
market price of such housing was not less than RMB7000. 77 Moreover, there were 
various discounts available to purchasers, so they actually paid only 10% to 20% ofthe 
market price.78 The per sq. meter selling price of public housing was mostly below 
RMB200, and the most expensive was no more than RMB400, nearly the same as that 
at the beginning of the reforms. 79 However, the average price per square meter of 
commodity housing in China had risen by 13-17 times, from RMB 120 - 150 in 1980 to 
RMB 1976 in 1997.80 At the end of 1993, when the price of commodity housing 
experienced a sharp increase, there occurred large-scale panic selling of housing at very 
low prices. The State Council had to ban the low-priced sale of housing twice at the end 
of 1993 and the beginning of 1994.81 In fact, in various places the sale price ofpublic 
housing was often much lower than the lowest price stipulated by the state, causing a 
huge loss of national assets. In practice, though the low-priced sale of public housing 
76 Liuqi, Zhufang yu Gaige Urban Development Research Institute 1992, pp221-230 
77 Wu, Yi "1997 Nian quanguo fangdichan kaifa yu shichang fengxi yiji 1998 nian zhanwang" in Beijing 
Fangdichan, Vol. 2, 1998,pp. 28-29 
78 Zhang, Zhongjun "Jiakuai zhufang huobi fenpei jizhi zhuanhuan peiyu zhufang jianshe xin de jinji 
zengzhangdian-shenhua chengzhen zhufang zhidu gaige de silu he zhengce jianyi", in Zhongguo 
Fangdich, Vol. 5, 1998 
79 Wang, Xiaoguang Gao, Guoli and Fan, Cairao Zhufang Ti=hi Gaige Guangdong: Guangdong Jingji 
Chubanshe, pp. 65-66 
80 Tan, Jian "The Trend of Commercial Housing's Prices" in Research on Real Estate Market vo/.2,1998, 
an unpublished weekly report on real estate market and policy edited by Beijing Dagana Real Estate 
Consulting Co., Ltd. p.3; Jiang, Wangrong "1997 Nian Zhongguo Fangdichan Shichang de Fayu yu 
Fazhan" p.6 (unpublished) 
81 Shang, Junfeng Gaige de Kundian yu Xingfendian Guangdon: Zhuhai Press 1998; pp. 124-126 
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can generate funds in the short term, the funds so generated are often difficult to realise. 
To make matters worse, in some regions, funds accumulated from house sales were 
mismanaged, misappropriated or wasted, though the government tried several times to 
prevent this. As a result, the limited sums generated by the housing reforms were nearly 
all dissipated. If urban housing continues to be sold off at a low price, it will make 
future housing reform more difficult. 
Table 4-3 Public Housing Selling Prices in Beijing (unit: RMB I sq. meter) 
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Cost price 
-
570~ 646~ 1165 1211 1337 1450 1450 1485 
700 790 
Standard 390~ 401~ 425~ 701~ 729~ 870~ 943~ 
- -
price 440 452 500 1099 1143 1257 1363 
Source: Cheng, Siwei Zhongguo Chengzhen Zhufang Zhidu Gaige-Mubiao Moshi yu 
Shishi Nandian, 1999, p.203 
2. Selling public housing on favourable terms cannot produce a fair return for the 
housing consumption fund deducted from the employees' wages. Only employees who 
buy public housing can get a return on their housing consumption fund deductions. 
Those who do not, or cannot buy, will have none of it returned. This is unfair on those 
employees who did not buy housing, especially who had not been allocated public 
housing (not being allocated public housing means one cannot buy it). They have had 
deductions from their wages paid into the housing consumption fund but have not 
benefited from this. The purpose of favourable terms was to return housing 
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consumption fund deductions to employees, but this method failed to achieve this 
equitably. 
3. Selling public housing stock on favourable terms did not resolve the social welfare 
housing problem. 
A great majority of employees can enjoy the benefit of cost price purchase when buying 
the public housing they occupy, but social welfare housing can only be provided to the 
small number of families who meet the low-income criteria. The covert allowance 
given through the preferential terms in the sale of public housing is actually a kind of 
"universal favour" or "equal sum" allowance. It does not help in the recovery of 
investment funds, nor does it help very low-income families. 
Secondly, most of the public housing was sold to those who were already renting the 
housing, i.e. those who had already been allocated housing, and they should not have 
been provided with a second tranch of subsidy. Guaranteeing them cost price purchase 
could only mean providing an additional covert allowance. Those with housing are 
given a covert allowance, but those without are not eligible to purchase, and naturally 
cannot get the allowance. As a consequence, those with housing or with surplus 
housing gain most of the state's allowances. But families with applications for housing 
and those without housing received little or no housing welfare allowances from the 
government. Yet they still had to remit funds, under the covert housing allowance 
policy, into the unified housing deduction system, in practice subsidising those 
fortunate enough to have public housing. In short, the preferential housing sale policy 
had noble intentions, but, as practice proved, selling public housing on favourable 
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terms in reality amounted to a low-priced sales promotion. It put too much emphasis on 
sales promotion, and too little on equity and reform. 
4. 4. Establishment of Housing Accumulation Fund (Zhufang gongjijin) 
In the Housing Accumulation Fund system, a work unit opens a personal accumulation 
fund account for every employee. Each month, the employees and the work unit deposit 
a certain percentage of the employees' wages into the account. The account balance 
belongs to the employees, earmarked for housing consumption. The Housing 
Accumulation Fund system is in essence a housing insurance system. But the work 
unit's "contribution" to the accumulation fund is a form of wages for the employees.82 
4. 4. I Accumulation Fund System 
The comprehensive implementation and constant improvement of the Housing 
Accumulation Fund system is a key part of housing reform. It is a decisive factor in the 
success of housing reform. 
The notion of a Housing Accumulation Fund system is borrowed from Singapore. The 
Decision that the State Council issued in 1994, the Directive On Strengthening the 
Housing Accumulation Fund's Administration (Guanyu jiaqiang zhufang gongjijin 
guanlide yijian) promulgated by the Leadership Group in Charge of Housing Reform 
under the State Council on August 8, 1996,83 and the Administrative Regulations on the 
82 Mei, Leru and Xiang, Jing Zhufang Gongjijin yu Zhufang Xindai Beijing: Zhongguo Wuzi Chubanshe, 
1996, pp.21-22 
83 Document No. 35 ofGuobanfa[ 1996 ], in Jianshebu zhuzhai yu fangdichanyesi and Jianshebu zhufang 
zhudu gaige bangongshi eds. Dangqian Zhufang Zhidu Gaige Zhengce Wenda Beijing: Zhongguo Wujia 
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Housing Accumulation Fund (Zhufang gongjijin guanli tiaoli), 84 which were 
promulgated by Prime Minister Zhu Rongji on 171h March 1999, all stipulated that a 
Housing Accumulation Fund system must be established in all administrative 
institutions and enterprises. Clear regulations were issued over property, payment, 
employment and so on. 
These three documents stipulated that both the employees and the institutions or 
enterprises should contribute at least 5% of the average monthly wage over the 
preceding year to the Housing Accumulation Fund. In better-off cities, the payment 
ratio could be appropriately raised. In terms of its purpose, the Housing Accumulation 
Fund was first be used to meet the demands of the employees to buy, construct and 
refurbish their housing. The main purpose in establishing the fund was to solve the 
housing problems of the employees. If one of the following conditions could be 
satisfied, the employee could withdraw the deposit balance in their housing 
accumulation fund account. 
I. To buy, rebuild or refurbish the accommodation one was living in or to construct new 
housing; 
2. Retired employees; 
3. Employees who had lost the ability to work and had terminated their employment 
relationship with the unit; 
4. Registered permanent residents who had been transferred out oftheir original cities, 
Chubanshe 1998, pp.179-182 
84 Guowuyuan di262hao ling, promulgated by the Prime Minister Zhu Rongji on 17th March 1999, in 
Beijing Fangdichan (Beijing Rea( Estate) Vol. 4, 1999, pp. 38-40 
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or counties, or emigrated abroad; 
5. To pay housing purchase loan interest; 
6.The rent has exceeded the prescribed ratio of family wage income. 
4. 4. 2. Philosophy 
I. The Housing Accumulation Fund system facilitates change in housing provision 
from an in kind benefit to a cash-based wage-linked savings system. It enables 
institutions to pay employees their housing allowance in cash (though in the form of a 
bank deposit linked to accommodation provision), to everyone in a standardised 
manner. This provides the prerequisite conditions for work units to break their ties with 
residential construction and achieve monetised provision. 85 
2. It can accelerate the accumulation of funds for increased residential construction. 
By 1998, 90% of the employees in Shanghai were contributing to the accumulation 
fund. From 1979 to 1989 investment in housing construction totalled 13240 million 
yuan, or about 1200 million yuan each year. By the 90s, the annual demand for 
residential construction in Shanghai was about 3000 million yuan. The accumulated 
fund grew year by year after the implementation of the housing accumulation policy 
(see Table 2-4). In 1995, the accumulated fund reached almost 3000 million yuan, equal 
to the total investment the whole city made in housing under the old system. In the 
current situation, some rich institutions can spare further funds for residential 
construction after contributing to the accumulation fund. Thus, the accumulation fund 
85 Hou, Shiyun and Shi, Zhanpeog Zhongguo Fanggai yu Zhu=hai Jianshe Wenti Baogao-Hong Lou 
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system has helped increase the total investment in residential construction. Those 
institutions or enterprises whose annual surplus fund was only enough to contribute to 
the accumulation fund but not enough for their own residential construction have 
contributed to the construction effort. 86 
Table 4-4 City of Shanghai Accumulation Fund (unit: I 00 million RMB yuan) 
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Total 
Accumulated 4.23 7.37 13.63 22.04 29.21 77.18 
fund 
Source: Zheng, Yefu" Chengzhe zhufang zhidu gaige de sikao (xu)" in 
Beijing Fangdichan vol.3, 1997, ppl2-l3 
3. It has increased the purchasing power of employees and raised residential 
. • 87 
constructiOn capacity 
First, employees who have contributed to the accumulation fund can resolve their own 
housing problems by loan financing and thus raising their purchasing power. In 
Shanghai, for example, the percentage of personal loans in the total loan rose from 1991 
to 1995 (see Table 2-5). In 1996, the Housing Accumulation Fund Management Centre 
of Shanghai provided personal loans of I 000 million yuan, and this increased in the 
following years. It even planned to stop granting loans to institutions and enterprises. 
This was of great significance. When the transformation from institutional loan to 
personal loan is achieved, the accumulation fund policy will exert great influence on a 
Wei JiShenyang: Shenyang Chubanshe 1998, p. 150-151 
86 Zheng, Yefu "Chengzhe zhufang zhidu gaige de sikao (xu)" Beijing Fangdichan, vo1.3, 1997, 
pp.12-13 
87 Wang, Xianqing Zhufang Geming, Guangdong: Guangdong Renmin Chubanshe, 1998, pp. 90-93 
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key part of the urban housing reforms - breaking ties with institutions and enterprises, 
and monetising housing provision. 
Table 4-5 Shanghai Housing Accumulation Fund Loans (Unit: I 00 million RMB yuan) 
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Total 
Total personal loans 0 0.19 0.4 1.09 4.94 6.62 
Institutional loans, direct 0.44 5.47 8.29 19.27 32.81 66.73 
residential constructional 
loans and others 
Personal loans as% of 0% 3.5% 4.8% 5.5% 15.1% 10% 
total loan sum 
Resource: Zheng, Yefu "Chengzhen zhufang zhidu gaige de sikao (xu)" in 
Beijing Fangdichan, Vol.3, 1997, ppl2-13 
Secondly, the accumulation fund system can ensure a reliable source of funds for 
housing development. Its low interest loans will lighten the burden on employees and 
help them solve their housing problem earlier. For example, on a 1 0-year 100 thousand 
RMB yuan loan, the personal accumulation fund interest rate is 5.13%, while the 
commercial housing loan interest rate is 7.65%. In the first case the borrower will repay 
1067 yuan per month, while those with a commercial housing loan will have to repay 
1195 yuan, a monthly difference of 128 yuan.88 
Thirdly, the system encourages employees to build up long-term savings, increasing 
their ability to buy, build or refurbish their housing. 
88 Unpublished documents offered by the Beijing Zhufang Zijin Guanli Zhongxin, Beijing, 1998 
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4. 4. 3. Limitations 
Though the accumulation fund approach is an efficient way of achieving the goal of 
monetised provision, and has basically been successful, it still suffers from several 
flaws at present. 
I. The accumulation fund is not retrospective and takes no account of previous 
deductions from wages even where employees have received no benefit from these. 
2. Viewed primarily as a source of low interest loans, the accumulation fund does not 
produce a good return for savers. The accumulation fund is a personal deposit account 
offering security and a return on investment. The level of return will directly affect the 
benefit to all its members. The level of return and the degree of security are also 
interrelated. The rate of return in Singapore plays an important role in increasing the 
wealth of the members. A certain return is guaranteed, with interest rates adjusted every 
six months in line with the market. Apart from investing the deposits in national debt, 
personal investments were allowed from 1986. Members were allowed to buy specified 
shares, credit bonds, institutional trust funds and savings guarantee bonds with 80% of 
their accumulation fund, over and above the obligatory minimum deposit. The trend is 
gradually to widen the investment scope into the asset fund market.89 China's Housing 
Accumulation Fund has mainly been used as a regulated low interest deposit and loan 
fund. Little consideration has been given to issues of security and return on investment 
89 Gao, Shangquan and Chu, Chuanheng "Xinjiapo de zhufang zhidu he gongjijin zhidu" in Zhongguo 
Cheng=hen Zhufang Zhidu Gaige Quanshu Beijing: Zhongguo Jihua Chubanshe, 1996, pp.683-689; 
Zhang,qiguang, "Xinjiapo de zhufang zhidu, gongjijin zhidu ji dui woguo de jiejian yiyi", in Beijing 
Fangdichan ( Beijing Real Estate), Voi.IO,I996, pp.38-41 
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in its practical operation.90 
For people who both make deposits and take out loans, the low interest nature of both 
counterbalances. However, those who do not plan to take out a loan to buy housing and 
have to contribute to the accumulation fund earning a low rate of interest obviously 
suffer losses. This violates the mutuality principle. 
3. Low contributions, low levels of savings 
In practice the contribution rate is still very low, and housing-related expenditure still 
comprises a very limited percentage of employees' wages. As a result the contribution 
rate to the public housing accumulation fund has been raised in some provinces and 
cities. The rate has been raised to 6% in Shanghai and in Jiangsu province, 7%-8% in 
Guangzhou, and 8% in Beijing. In Shanghai, an additional accumulation fund has been 
established. Apart from the 6% that individuals and institutions contribute, better off 
institutions or enterprises can raise their institutional contribution by 1% - 9%. Even 
when the national contribution average reaches over 5%, the housing consumption fund 
accounts for no more than 10% of employees' wages. This is far below the 30% in 
developed countries. 91 Furthermore, although the accumulation fund system has been 
in operation for a few years, and there are still very low amounts in personal accounts, 
only I 0% in Shanghai (see Table 2-5). It is impossible for employees to buy housing 
with such small amounts of funds. 
4.As solely a housing fund, the Housing Accumulation Fund lacks benefits 
90 Wang, Xianqing and Wu, Shaoping Huobi Fenfang Beijing: Gaige Chubanshe, 1998, p.113 
91 Jianshebu zhuzhai yu fangaichanyesi and Jianshebu zhufang zhudu gaige bangongshi, Dangqian 
Zhufang Zhidu Gaige Zhengce Wenda Beijing: Zhongguo Wujia Chubanshe, 1998, pp.28-29 
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The accumulation fund system follows the Singaporean model. The central 
accumulation fund of Singapore began from an endowment insurance fund, and was 
later extended into housing, medical treatment, education, and family benefits. Now it 
has become a multi-functional security fund. The success of Singapore's accumulation 
fund system lies in its overall planning, and multi-function application. The 
accumulation fund produces generous benefits, especially when endowment insurance 
and housing are appropriately combined. Its emphasis changes over time as well. 
During the first half of the employees' membership, the accumulation fund is used for 
housing. In the latter half it offers lifestyle benefits. This is called "One system with two 
functions." For both individual employees and their institutions, the expenditure burden 
is light; fund management expenses are also very low, and so the returns are high.92 But 
the accumulation fund in China is just used solely for housing and it does not the 
advantages ofthe Singaporean version. As a result, Chinese economists have urged that 
the Housing Accumulation Fund should be increased in value.93 
4. 5 Accelerating the Construction of Economic and Practical Housing (Jingji shiyong 
fang) 
4. 5. 1 Policy Details 
The Decision treats establishing an Economic and Practical Housing supply system, 
designed for the middle and low-income families, as one of the basic planks of the 
92 Zhang, Jing "Guanyu zhufang gongjijin lifa de sikao", in Zhu:hai yu Fangdichan, Vol. 3, 1997, pp. 
22-25 
93 Li, Yining Zhongguo Zhu:hai Shichang de Fa:han yu Zhengce Fenxi, Beijing: Zhongguo Wuzi 
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urban housing reforms. It characterises the construction of Economic and Practical 
Housing as an ancillary policy ofthe reform. 
The Decision explains that Economic and Practical Housing is low-cost low-priced 
housing suited to the purchasing power of middle and low-income families. There are 
different names for Economic and Practical Housing in different parts of the country, 
such as "xiaokang zhufang" (comfortable housing), "kangju zhufang" (comfortable 
living housing), "shiyongxing fang" (utility housing), "anju zhufang" (peaceful living 
housing), and "jiekun zhufang" (problem relieving housing), etc. Economic and 
Practical Housing features the concept of being both economic and practical. 
"Economic" means not only good value but also is affordable by the middle- and 
low-income families, representing a good investment. "Practical" means that the 
housing must serve its purpose in terms of design and standard of construction, and 
offer comfortable living. Over time the standards of Economic and Practical Housing 
will change qualitatively as the rapid development of the national economy and 
people's rising affluence permit a higher specification. 
4. 5. 2. Philosophy 
The policy planners and scholars, who support the policy of Economic and Practical 
Housing, view the policy as aimed at solving the housing problems of middle and 
low-income residents in a manner, which accords, with the fundamental principles of 
the market. As a housing supply system with social welfare aims, it should have both 
Chubanshe, 1999,pp. 72-73 
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market supervisory and income redistribution functions. Being an important part of the 
intensified housing reforms, its objectives have been spelled out from the very 
beginning. It is to be consistent with the objectives of the housing reforms, and aims to 
establish a new urban housing system that is compatible with a socialist 
market-oriented economic system, with the goal of commercialising and socialising 
housing. It also seeks to accelerate residential construction, to improve living 
conditions, and satisfy the increasing housing demands of urban residents.94 
I. To attain the housing reform objectives there is a need to accelerate the rate of 
construction of Economic and Practical Housing. 
In constructing Economic and Practical Housing the ultimate goals are to improve the 
living conditions and satisfy the demand for improved housing of urban residents. Its 
real purpose is to alleviate the problem of housing shortages, to guide housing 
investment, and to solve the problems of middie and low-income urban families, by 
improving their living conditions, enabling them to experience directly the benefits of 
housing reform. The construction of Economic and Practical Housing has been seen as 
one of the main ways of attaining the housing reform goals. 
2. To achieve basic housing reform, it is necessary to accelerate the development and 
construction ofEconomic and Practical Housing. 
The construction of Economic and Practical Housing is closely related to other 
components ofthe housing reforms. It demands an entirely new system of housing 
94 Hou, Ximin Ying, Hong and Zhang, Yaping Weiyou Guansha Qiamvanjin Guangxi: Guangxi Shifan 
Daxue Chubanshe, 1999, pp. 145-153; Wang, Xiaoguan Gao, Guoli and Fan, Caiyao Zhufang Ti:hi 
Gaige Guangdong: Guangdong Jingji Chubanshe, 1999, pp. 220-225 
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investment, construction, allocation and management supported by appropriate 
financial policies. Being aimed at middle- and low-income families, it will form a 
major sector of the real estate market. 
3. The role of Economic and Practical Housing in the development of the socialist 
market-oriented economy. 
The Fourteenth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party established the theory of a 
socialist market-oriented economic system. The Decision restated the intention of 
"establishing a new urban housing system that is compatible with the socialist 
market-oriented economic system". Middle and.low-income people still accounted for 
great majority in the 1990s. A "two-legged" approach was to be applied combining 
market-oriented financial discipline with social welfare objectives. It also defined the 
roles of the state and the real estate developers in the provision of housing. 
4. 5. 3. Problems 
The policy is based on a misunderstanding of the market economy. The only effective 
way of alleviating the housing shortage, balancing supply and demand, and solving the 
problem of the high price of commodity housing is to establish a market-based system. 
The introduction of Economical and Practic~l Housing is just another type of 
government administrative measure. Evidence from the housing sector before housing 
reforms indicates that administrative planning measures cannot solve the housing 
problem. Introduced and promoted by the government, Economic and Practical 
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Housing will inevitably undermine the commodity housing market because it receives 
subsidies from the government. Therefore, using Economic and Practical Housing to 
improve the living conditions and to satisfy the demand for better housing of urban 
residents, is in conflict with the fundamental goal of commercialising the urban housing 
sector. 
Economic and Practical Housing suffered from the following problems. 
I. Weak management 
The housing was often designed either beyond the criteria, with the result that the cost 
was too high, or beiow the criteria, in which case it did not meet its intended purpose. 
Much Economic and Practical Housing was inconveniently situated; facilities were 
lacking and build quality was poor. Because of these problems, the housing was unable 
to attract sufficient buyers. 
As stipulated, the land for Economic and Practical Housing was usually transferred by 
the government, free of charge. But land sales were an important source of finance for 
many local governments. So most cities were reluctant to spare land in the centre of the 
city for Economic and Practical Housing. Such housing was usually situated on the city 
boundary, in out of the way places with poor infrastructure. In principle, the 
infrastructure and 50% of the non-welfare services were to be financed for Economic 
and Practical Housing by city governments. But due to financial limitations and the 
scale of the works required, these lagged behind. As a result there was inconvenience 
for residents and people thinking of buying property in these areas decided against. 
What people feared most was poor construction quality. It was very difficult to achieve 
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high quality at low cost. The Anju housing designed by the Construction and 
Reconnaissance Engineering Academy ofQinghai province, which was exposed by the 
media for its serious quality problems, was one example. Towards the end of 1995, in 
order to solve the housing problems of middle-aged and young technical staff, the 
Construction and Reconnaissance Engineering Academy of Qinghai province decided 
to construct a development of 'comfortable housing' with funds raised from the staff 
applying for housing and an allowance provided by the academy. Construction was 
started in April 1996 and should have been completed by the end of the same year. But 
for various reasons, it was not until October 1997 that, after negotiations between the 
two sides, it was handed over without being checked by the quality supervision 
department. After the long wait, the excited residents ascended the new building with 
their door keys but were shocked by the scene in front of them: leaning walls, twisted 
windows and doors, leaking pipes in nearly every unit, seepage down the walls of many 
apartments, and water pouring from the drains in some units. The "comfortable 
housing" became "heartbreak mansion" for buyers.95 
2. Economic and Practical Housing was not as economical as it was intended to be. 
The price of Economic and Practical Housing was not as low as people expected, 
especially the middle and low-income families. There were several reasons for this. 
Firstly, the preferential policies supporting Economic and Practical Housing were 
difficult to implement. Just as a few years previously when the state made a solemn 
determination to reduce the price of commodity housing but made little progress, many 
95 Wang, Xianqing and Wu, Shaoping Huobi Fenfang Beijing: Gaige Chubanshe 1998, p.51 
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of the preferential policies met with stubborn resistance and were hard to implement. 
They impinged on the interests of the local governments and different departments 
concerned. A twin-track system emerged in land usage for urban residential 
construction: free transfer for the construction of Economic and Practical Housing and 
charged transfer for commodity housing. But in actual practice, the land for Economic 
and Practical Housing was not freely transferred in many regions, and so this policy 
was a dead letter. Some local governments charged either for their own benefit or 
because of lack of co-operation between concerned departments. This was one of their 
"additional incomes". Though administrative transfer of construction land for 
Economic and Practical Housing was applied in some places, only the land charge was 
dispensed with, other land taxes were still levied. Secondly, sharp businessmen jumped 
on the "Economic and Practical Housing" bandwagon to offer commodity housing in 
disguise. Compared with commodity housing, Economic and Practical Housing can be 
built quicker and is easier to sell; both ofthese produce finance savings for developers. 
With government aid, construction loans for Economic and Practical Housing are 
provided on lenient terms. Because of these advantages, many real estate developers 
rush to offer it. According to state regulations, the price of Economic and Practical 
Housing includes all charges, including construction, provision of utilities, surveying 
and designing, planning, and so on, totaling seven items, with a maximum profit of not 
more than 3% specified.96 In reality, some developers bought land at a very low price to 
build Economic and Practical Housing but sold the dwellings at high prices. They did 
96 Yu, Feng "Jingji shiyongfang ruhe jinru baixiangjiating", in Beijng Fangdichan (Beijing Real Estate), 
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not follow the state prescribed Economic and Practical Housing pricing structure, but 
added things that should have been included, lifting up the price. At the same time, the 
authorities did not exercise enough supervision over the construction and sale of the 
Economic and Practical Housing, contributing to the price hikes. Thirdly, the cost of 
ancillary facilities was too high, adding to the construction costs of Economic and 
Practical Housing. In many countries, the infrastructure costs are borne by the state. 
Since the Economic and Practical Housing was to be sold to middle and low-income 
families with limited means, it was appropriate for local government keep costs down 
by providing ancillary facilities. In practice they forced developers to provide these, 
and they passed on the costs to the buyers. This is one of the reasons why the price of 
Economic and Practical Housing was very high. Fourthly, there were no strict checks 
on intended purchasers. In principle, the intended buyers of Economic and Practical 
Housing should be middle and low-income families: civil servants, staff of state-run 
institutions and enterprises, teachers and so on. Though there are rules governing 
eligible buyers, local governments did not see the need for strict verification of the 
qualifications of the buyers in order to ensure sales went well. Furthermore, the 
definition of middle and low-income varies from place to place. As one does not need 
to have ones eligibility verified to buy Economic and Practical Housing, some 
higher-income families also purchased E & P housing, but mainly for investment rather 
than occupation. This had two effects: it inflated the prices of E & P housing, and 
Vol. 7, 1998, pp.33-35 
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affected the price and viability of commodity housing developments.97 
Finally, the rent of public housing was still much lower than the market rent even by the 
year 2000, failing to reach the scheduled target of 15% of average family income. Low 
rents affected people's willingness to buy and thus affected the commercialisation 
process. The preferential sales of public housing did not receive enough publicity. 
Different pricing structures for public housing, such as the standard price and the cost 
price, sent confused price signals and created difficulties in the secondary market, 
resulting in a disorderly market. Savings levels in the Housing Accumulation Fund 
were too low, and its administration was ineffective, so it failed to have a significant 
impact on the market. Promoted by the government as a hybrid commercial and welfare 
commodity, Economic and Practical Housing was in fact neither one nor the other. 
Benefiting from government policy, it undermined genuine commodity housing and 
affected the efficient operation of the market. As one of the main housing reform 
measures of the 1990s, Economic and Practical Housing conflicts with the goal to 
commercialise urban housing. All this resulted in the failure of a real market-based 
structure to emerge. The amount of housing investment made by central or local 
governments and work units still amounted to a large proportion of the total investment 
in urban housing. Secondly, the dual price system created two housing markets: an 
97 Criticism from the developers is especially strong. For more details, please see Pan, Shiyi "Shichang 
de Wenti Yaokao Shichang de Shouduan Qu Jiejue" and Wu, Yan "Zhechangqiu Women Ti Haishi Buti"; 
and Ren, Zhiqiang "Kaifashang Suomiandui de Shi Shichang" in Beijing Fangdichan vol. 2, 1999; Ren, 
Zhiqiang "Fangdichan Kaifa zhong de Lilun he Zhengce" in Kan, Jun eds. Toushi yu Fenxi Beijing: 
Zhongguo Renshi Chubanshe 1998, pp. 112, 113; Ren, Zhiqiang "Fanggai dui Shichang Jingji de 
Yingxiang" and "Fanggai Zhengce he Shichang Jingji de Guanxi" in Kan, Jun eds. Toushi yu Fenxi 
Beijing: Gaige Chubanshe 1999, p.194 and p.202 
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'internal housing market' and an 'open housing market'. The former still follows the old 
welfare housing system. The latter is very limited in its range and size. Thirdly, rent 
reform failed to stimulate investment by individuals in housing and the rent for public 
housing still is subsidised by the government and by work units. One can argue that the 
reforms have not fundamentally changed the old housing system. 
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Cllnapter 5 Monetised lHiousing Provision -A New Era in lHiousing 
Reform 
5. 1. Flaws in the Four Housing Reform Measures 
As can be seen from the analysis in the previous chapter, despite considerable 
achievements in the housing reform over the past decade, the four housing reform 
measures (rent reform, sale of public housing, creation of the Housing Accumulation 
Fund and development of Economic and Practical Housing), failed to promote the 
commercialization of housing as expected. The reform program did not really change 
China's earlier welfare in kind housing allocation system. Apart from the four 
disadvantages described in Chapter 1, the welfare in kind allocation system manifested 
a series of further drawbacks that became increasingly marked. 
First, a cycle of "sale and re-sale" occurred in many work units during the 
implementation of the reform programme. Many dwellings, which were built as 
commodity housing, were collectively purchased by work units, including state-owned 
enterprises and governmental institutions, bringing newly built housing back into the 
old allocation system. The so-called "public housing discount " became a kind of 
legalised cut-price sale, which even applied to newly built homes. Many work units 
bought commodity housing at a high price in the market, which they then sold on to 
their staff as "public housing" at the "housing reform plus discount" price. In 1996, 301 
million sq. meters of new housing was constructed all over the country, with 66% of 
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this either built or purchased by work units for distribution to their employees.98 This 
contributed to the abnormally high-price of ordinary commodity housing during the 
transition stage from the old housing system. It resulted in prices well beyond the 
purchasing power of middle-income families. As a consequence, a strange dichotomy 
appeared in China's real estate market. On the one hand, China had 70 million square 
meters of vacant commodity housing for sale, yet on the other hand, it had over 4 
million families suffering from serious housing shortages. 99 The high price of 
commodity housing not only hindered the steady development of the housing industry 
and restricted the growth of the economy; it also deprived many families of the 
possibility of owning their own residence. This gradually turned into a social problem. 
Secondly, the housing industry was stuck in a vicious circle of "investment without 
efficient production". The housing reforms did not radically change the existing 
housing system because the welfare in kind housing allocation system, in which the 
work unit constructed housing and allocated it to the staff, produced no measurable 
output. Therefore, the more houses that were constructed and allocated, the more 
money was lost. According to Mr. Kang Shaoting, vice president ofBeijing Real Estate 
Research Association, during the period of"the Eighth Five-Year Plan" (Bawujihua) in 
which China's economy enjoyed rapid growth, investment in housing reached its peak 
at RMB 831.5 billion, with 1 billion square meters of residential housing being built. 
The annual investment at this time reached RMB 166.3 billion, 50% of which came 
98 Cheng, Siwei Zhongguo Chengzhen Zhufang Zhidu Gaige-Mubiao Moshi yu shishi Nandian, 
Beijing: Minzhu yu Jianshe Chubanshe, p. 14 
99 See Introduction 
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from the government or state-run institutions. The housing that was built still fell into 
the welfare system (both through housing all9cation and the sale of public housing at 
housing reform prices). Kang's calculations, based on statistics provided by the Real 
Estate Industry Department of the Construction Ministry, revealed that commodity 
housing from the old system constituted 40-50% of the total urban public housing stock. 
On the other hand, with the increase in the stock of the public housing, which still 
operated under the old housing system, and with the increase in average per capita 
living space, the government had to pay out more welfare allowances, adding to its 
financial burdens. As Kang reported, in 1978, when the average urban per capita living 
space was 3.6 square meters, the housing rent allowance provided by the government or 
work units was RMB 28.08 per capita annually. However by 1995, when the average 
per capita living space had reached 8.1 square meters, the annual housing allowance per 
capita was as high as RMB 1960, about 50% of the annual average per capita cost of 
living, making housing the biggest slice of the welfare allowances. 100 With the 
reversion of newly constructed housing to the old housing system and the rise in house 
prices, the cost of commercialisation of housing was increasing too, at an annual rate of 
30%. 101 In other words, if the housing allocation system remained unchanged, the more 
residential apartments that were built, the more housing would revert to the old system, 
and the higher the cost of housing reform, and the more difficult it would be to 
implement. This made the monetisation ofhousing essential. 
100 Interview of Mr. Kang Shaoting by the writer in May 1998. 
101 Li, Tieying "Quanmin guanche luoshi jueding, jiakuaijianshe chengzhen zhufang xin tizhi" in 
Fangdichan bao S'h December, 1995 
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5. 2. Background to Monetisation Policy 
The improvement in social and economic circumstances brought by the post-1978 
Reform and Open Door policy not only made the need for reform of housing allocation 
more urgent, it also provided favourable conditions for the monetisation of housing 
allocation. 
5. 2. 1. Monetisation as the Answer to Reform Deadlock 
1.The conflict between welfare-in-kind housing provision and work-based provision 
Housing provision in kind was based on the idea of egalitarianism within a work unit, 
and as such was unable to motivate the employees to improve their work performance. 
Secondly, it could result in malpractices and an inequitable distribution of advantages 
and disadvantages between different work units and between individuals. Whether one 
was allocated a flat, to a great extent depended on the housing resources of a work unit, 
and not on individual's work contribution. Leaders of work units abused their power 
and gave themselves superior or additional accommodation. This led to 
under-utilisation of accommodation while most people were struggling on 
over-crowded conditions. Only through monetisation was it possible to relate 
accommodation entitlement to work achievements. With monetisation, a person's 
housing allowance is included their pay and entitlement to accommodation increases 
with salary. This also resolved the labour mobility problems resulting from housing 
being tied to the work-unit. 
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2.Conflict between in kind housing provision commercialisation 
First, in kind housing provision diminished people's desire to buy their own homes. 
The savings of employees were not being used to finance housing construction. They 
relied instead on the government and their work units to solve their housing problems. 
This was called "waiting for, depending on, and asking for". If their work units could 
allocate housing, even though employees had millions ofyuan in savings, they would 
not be willing to go into the real estate market to purchase their own property. They 
used their savings for other things. In 1997, the housing costs of a Chinese family were 
only 3.55% of income, even less than the cost of water, gas and electricity (see Table 
3-1 ). Monetisation forced employees to take personal responsibility for housing and 
thus change their consumption habits and motivate them into making a housing 
purchase. Secondly, in-kind housing allocation had depressed cash incomes. However, 
housing commercialisation requires that housing be charged and sold according to its 
real value. This made it unaffordable, dampening demand in the real estate market. In 
the late 1990's, the average price of a standard commodity housing apartment in China 
stood at a ratio of 6 to 7 against the average family annual income. In comparison with 
international norms, where the ratio is between 3 and 6 or optimally 5, 102 it seems that 
Chinese was approaching the international standard. However, this ratio did not reflect 
the differences between different cities. In China, the price differential of residential 
property in big cities and small towns differed greatly (see Table 3-2). The price of 
housing in big cities might be 10 times higher than that in small towns, but the income 
102 The World Bank China: Implementation Options for Urban Housing Reform, Washington, D. C., 
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difference was far lower. The average family income in Beijing and Shanghai was at 
most 2 or 3 times that of small towns. In big cities like Beijing and Shanghai, the price 
of one square meter of housing in a fairly good location could cost from RMB 6000 to 
RMB I 0000. The price: income ratio was between 12 and 18 to one. So in big cities 
such as Beijing, employees cannot possibly afford commodity housing. To increase the 
purchasing power of employees, the housing consumption proportion of an employees' 
pay needed to be raised, and monetisation of housing distribution needed to be 
introduced. Thirdly, housing distributed in kind was not a commodity and could not 
enter the market. This weakened the housing supply market. 
Table 5.1 Housing Expenditure as a Percentage ofTotal Urban Family Expenditure 
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Total expenses 1672 2111 2851 3538 3919 4186 
(yuan/person) 
Housing 2.14% 2.51% 2.77% 2.93% 3.17% 3.55% 
Utilities 3.82% 4.12% 4.00% 4.14% 4.51% 5.02% 
Source: Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian 1993/1995/ 1996 and Zhongguo Tongji Zhaiyao 
1998China's Statistics Abstract 1998 
1992, p. 12 84 
Table 5. 2. Ratio ofHousing Costs to Family Income in Cities and Provinces in 1995 
Provinces Average price of Average per capita Housing 
and cities commodity housing annual family income price/family 
(RMB yuan/square annual income 
meter) 
Beijing 3226.52 6235.00 9.61 
Tianjin 2119.43 4929.53 7.99 
Shanghai 2478.53 7179.77 6.40 
Guangdong 2819.77 7438.70 7.04 
Hubei 2187.50 4028.63 10.09 
Hunan 869.57 4699.23 3.44 
Hen an 780.02 3299.46 4.39 
Gansu 1169.87 3152.52 6.89 
Qinghai 1032.27 3319.85 5.78 
Xinjiang 1334.41 4163.44 5.95 
National 1612 4282.95 6.99 
mean 
Source: Zhongguo Tongji Nianjianl 996 and Jianshebu zhuzhai yu fangdichanyesi and 
Jianshebu xinxi zhongxin "1995 Nian fangdichan kaifa fenxi baogao" 
3. The conflict between in kind housing allocation and employment system reform 
In a market-oriented economy, the housing allowance is included in the employees' 
wage, paid monthly or weekly, so employees have to save for years before they can 
afford to buy a home. However, under the in-kind allocation system, the allocation is 
inflexible and can only be made once. This meant that the future housing allowances 
were paid ahead of time so that those employees who had been allocated housing were 
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forbidden to leave their job unless they turned over their residence to their work units. 
Those who had no housing allocated to them were reluctant to leave, as they had not 
received their entitlement of housing wages. Thus employees established a binding 
relationship with their institutions, making the normal flow of labour difficult. This 
went against the requirement of a market-oriented economy for reasonable labour 
mobility. So, in kind housing provision formed the critical factor that blocked reform of 
the employment system. 
4. The conflict between in kind housing provision and the development of market-led 
ownership 
Since implementation of the Reform and Open Door policy, the number of 
non-state-run enterprise employees as a percentage of the total employee population 
has increased contributing to the formation of the dual-track system in housing 
provision. The monetised system was applied to non-state-run enterprises. Employees 
earned a much higher salary compared with that of state-run enterprise employees but 
had to purchase their housing in the market, as the enterprises did not offer housing. In 
state-run enterprises, the in kind housing provision system was still in operation. Hence, 
there emerged the "one family, two systems" (yijia liangzhi) phenomenon. One member 
of the couple applied to their government institutions or state-run enterprise employer 
for housing, while the other earned high pay in a foreign enterprises or similar. In effect, 
the housing of the employee of the non-state-run enterprise was actually provided by 
the state-owned institutions, thus greatly increasing the burden on state-owned 
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institutions, especially state-run enterprises. 103 
5. The conflict between in kind housing provision and the establishment of a modem 
enterprise system 
In a modern enterprise system, the goal of enterprise management should be to work 
efficiently and generate a profit. The living problems of employees should be solved by 
the employees themselves in the market, and not by enterprises, which do not have the 
expertise to solve these problems. However, in.-kind housing provision turned every 
enterprise into a property company. The investment of manpower, material and 
financial resources in property management rather than the enterprise's main business 
formed an obstacle to increasing profitability and competitiveness. Statistics provided 
by Dr. He Maochun, researcher at the International Economic and Trade Research 
Institute, indicated that the annual investment by state-run enterprises in housing 
construction and maintenance from 1992 to 1994 was 1400 billion RMB yuan. With 
interest costs added, the total annual housing expenditure of the state-run enterprises 
amounted to around 1600 billion RMB. This was a heavy burden for the enterprises.104 
This was also one of the main reasons for the slow development of state-run enterprises. 
When housing provision is monetised, the housing allowance ofthe employees is built 
into their wages, so employees no longer ask their leaders for housing but go into the 
real estate market themselves and purchase their own housing. They do so according to 
103 Hou, Xi m in Ying, Hong and Zhang, Yaping Weiyou Guangsha Qianwan Jian Guilin: Guangxi 
Shifan Daxue Chubanshe 1999, p. 32 
104 Interview to Dr. He Maochun, writer of Zhongguo duiwai Jingmao Baipishu, in February 1998; 
Zhang, Qiguang, "Fuli fenfang shouzhong zhengqin, huobi fenpei daju yiding", in Beijing Fangdichan 
( Beijing Real Estate), Vol.4, 1998, p.8 
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their personal resources, causing housing provision to be better distributed. So, only 
through monetisation of housing could government institutions and enterprises be freed 
from the heavy pressure of housing construction and allocation, and thus improve their 
working efficiency. 
6. The conflict between in-kind housing provision and industrialization of housing 
supply 
The development of the housing industry could stimulate a series of industries to 
develop alongside it. Not only could it give direct impetus to the development of the 
construction, decoration, building material, electrical home appliance and furniture 
industries, it could also bring along the development of more than 50 related industries 
like the steel industry, mechanical and electrical industry, textile industry, chemical 
industry and transportation industry. The industrialization of housing development 
depended on continuity in investment, but the existing system was a black hole for 
funds, swallowing up endless government money but not even producing enough in 
rent to cover the maintenance. It was hard to maintain the existing stock, let alone 
increase it. The more residential housing was constructed, the bigger the losses. 
Furthermore, the cost of the uncoordinated construction and maintenance by different 
work units was high. Under such a system, it was very difficult to upgrade housing, and 
it was hard to improve the living conditions of the employees. If housing distribution 
could be monetised, the new investment generated by real estate development 
enterprises could be employed in the construction, and sale of residential housing. 
Housing construction could be transformed from unplanned, scattered owner-building, 
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to co-ordinated development carried out by specialists. Housing management would 
change to professional, specialized manageme'ht. Thus only through monetisation of 
housing provision could the overall standard of housing production be raised, the living 
conditions of employees improved, and the professionalisation of housing construction 
and management finally achieved. 
5. 2. 2. Background to Monetisation 
1. The consumer awareness of Chinese residents was gradually increasing. More 
and more employees began to resort to the market to solve their housing 
problems instead of just waiting for their work units to allocate housing to them. 
The survey of national consumption intentions conducted by China Real Estate 
Information Centre in 1997 indicated that half of urban citizens had the 
intention to purchase their own residence, while only 30% were reluctant to 
make the purchase. 105 The percentage of private ownership of residences kept 
increasing (see Table 3 - 3), as did the percentage of individual purchases of 
commodity housing (see Table 3 - 4). The housing sold from January to 
November 1997 increased by 115% compared with the same period in 1996, 
with individual purchases accounting for 58.7%, 27.7% higher than the same 
period in 1996. 106 
105 Interview to Mr. Hu, Lujun 
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Table 5-3 Ratio of Private Ownership of Urban Housing 
(Unit: ten thousand square meters) 
Year Total urban Private residence area Proportion of private 
residence area ownership (%) 
1990 199553 48362 24.24 
1991 216450 65368 30.20 
1992 239549 70544 29.45 
1993 259580 79521 30.63 
1994 291377 94564 32.45 
Source: Jianshebu "Chengshi Jianshe Tongji Nianbao" (1990-1994) 
Table 5-4 Sales of Commodity Housing 
(Unit: ten thousand square meters) 
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Actual 2545 2745 3812 6035 6118 6787 6898 
area sold 
Individual 731 927 1456 2943 3345 3345 3667 
purchases 
by area 
%of 29% 34% 38% 49% 55% 49% 53% 
individual 
purchases 
Source: Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian 1997 Beijing: Zhongguo Tongji Cubans 1997 
2. Increased purchasing power of Chinese employees 
I). The ratio of house price to income in some regions in China had entered a 
106 Liu, Lifeng "1997-1998 Nian Guding Zichan T~~zi Xingshi" in Beijing Fangdichan vol. 2, 1998 
reasonable level. From Table 3-2, it can be seen that the interrelationship between 
annual family income and the ratio of house price to income in different regions 
demonstrates a "U" curve. In most small towns, the price of commodity housing in the 
second half of the 1990s ranged from 600 to 800 RMB yuan per square meter. The ratio 
of price to annual household income reached the reasonable range of 3 to 6 times. 
Middle-income families in middle sized cities or small towns could now afford a 
commodity flat of 60 square meters. 
2). Monetisation of housing distribution was applied to a considerable number of 
people. The reform ofthe employment system deprived the in kind housing provision 
system of support. Some state-owned enterprises abandoned the system of in kind 
provision, and added a housing allowance sum to employees' wages in the same way as 
joint ventures and private businesses. Those who worked for profitable joint venture 
and domestic enterprises enjoyed a high income and sufficient housing allowance 
within their wages. For the self-employed (getihu) and managers of collective 
enterprises Giti qiye), whose income and expenditure already operated according to 
market laws, there was no arrangement for the deduction of housing expenses from 
their wages. With the implementation of the Reform and Opening Up policy, the 
percentage of employees in non-state economic units increased (see Table3-5), 
indicating a decreasing proportion of in kind housing provision and an increase in the 
monetisation of housing. 
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Table 5-5. Proportion ofUrban Employees in Various Types of Economic Units 
(Unit: %) 
Year State Coli Joint stock Forei- Hong Other Priva Self-
-run ec-ti ven- com-p gn Kong, types -te empl 
ve tu re any invest Macao enter- oyed 
-ment and prise 
Taiwan 
invest-
ment 
1978 78.3 21.5 0.02 
1990 62.3 21.4 0.06 0.04 0.002 0.001 0.03 3.70 
1991 62.8 21.4 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.001 0.04 4.08 
1992 63.2 21.0 0.03 0.08 0.05 0.003 0.06 4.29 
1993 62.1 19.3 0.04 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.01 1.06 5.29 
1994 60.9 17.8 0.03 1.59 1.06 1.15 0.005 1.80 6.65 
1995 59.0 16.5 0.03 1.66· 1.26 1.42 0.006 2.54 8.17 
1996 56.7 15.2 0.02 1.83 1.39 1.34 0.005 3.13 8.62 
Calculation based on Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian1997 
3). Bringing the privatised public housing to market greatly increased the purchasing 
power of employees. 1995 to 1997 was the period, which witnessed the most rapid 
privatisation of public housing since the reform was initiated in 1978. Private housing 
ownership increased from 32.45% in 1994 to 55.8% in 1998, and to 60% in some cities 
and provinces. 107 This increase in private housing ownership was a result of selling off 
public housing. If the privatised public housing could be put on the market, it could 
107 Jianshebu zhuzhai yu fangdichanyesi and Jianshebu zhufang zhudu gaige bangongshi Dangqian 
Zhufang Zhidu Gaige Zhengce Wenda Beijing: Zhongguo Wujia Chubanshe, 1998, p.7 
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greatly enhance the purchasing power of the employees. Take Shanghai for example. 
From 1993 to the end of March 1999, 740.4 thousand public apartments were sold, 
accounting for a construction area of 39.72 million sq. meters. From August 1996 to 
March 1999, 16,000 privatised public apartments were put on the market, with 80% of 
sellers buying new apartments using an extra investment averaging 160,000 RMB per 
family. 108 4. The rental cost.of public housing increased relatively (see Table 3-6). The 
percentage of housing expenditure as a proportion of the total for urban citizens kept 
increasing (see Table 3-1). Housing rent as a proportion of urban families' total income 
also increased. Economic rents appeared in some cities and enterprises. 
Table 5-6. Public Housing Rent Changes 
Unit ( yuan/m') 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Beijing 0.28 0.55 0.87 1.30 1.30 
Xi'an 0.33 0.42 0.68 1.16 1.51 
Xiamen 0.70 0.70 1.40 1.70 1.96 
Shenzhen 2.06 3.46 3.46 7.67 7.76 
Source: Lu, Youjie "Zhufang fenpei jizhi zhuanhuan de xianshi yiyi he zuoyong" 
Zhongguo Fangdichan, Vol. 6, 1998 
2. Necessary pre-conditions for monetisation 
108 Li, Yining Zhongguo Zhu:hai Shichang de Fa:han yu Zhengce Fenxi, Beijing: Zhongguo Wuzi 
Chubanshe, 1999,p.219 
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(1) The Housing Accumulation Fund system to be operating all over the country. In 
1994, the national Housing Accumulation Fund amounted to 11 billion RMB, over 
20 billion yuan in 1995, and 39.3 billion yuan in 1996109 By 1998, the Housing 
Accumulation Fund system extended to 35 big cities and 223 medium sized cities in 
31 provinces, including 65% of their total employee populations. By June 30, 1998, 
the total national fund was 89 billion yuan. Many cities and institutions had raised 
their payment ratio for Housing Accumulation Fund or had established a 
supplementary housing accumulation fund system. 110 This not only provided funds 
for the monetisation of housing provision, it also enabled the work units to pay their 
employees a cash housing allowance as part of their wages (though in the form of a 
deposit). This established the precondition for work units to cease housing 
construction, and set the pattern for housing allowance monetisation. 
(2)A basic housing finance system had been established. Personal housing finance 
composed of the Housing Accumulation Fund loan and a commercial bank loan, 
opened a new channel for individuals to fiance house purchase. The housing credit 
structure changed from one aimed at supporting housing developers to one 
supporting the housing finance of individuals. The percentage purchasers could 
borrow was also increased. In 1998, housing loans granted by commercial banks 
were set at 15% of the newly increased figure. At the beginning of the same year, 
the Construction Bank of China planned to grant 35 billion RMB of individual 
109 Guowuyuan Fanggaiban, "1996 Nian quanguo fanggai gongzuo zongshu", in Zhu=hai yu Fangdichan 
Vol.11997; p.15 
110 Jianshebu zhuzhai yu fangdichanyesi and Jianshebu zhufang zhudu gaige bangongshi, Dangqian 
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housing loans, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China planned to grant 20 
billion RMB, and the Agricultural Bank of China planned to grant 10 billion 
RMB. 111 The number of financial institutions permitted to offer housing loans was 
increased, with all the independent commercial investment banks, the 
Communications Bank and housing savings banks now permitted to offer such 
loans. 
5. 2 3. International and Domestic Background 
1. On the basis of international experience and China's actual situation, the moment for 
monetisation of housing provision had already come. A general survey of the economic 
development of each country shows that an average per capita income of US$300 to 
US$1 000 per year is the key to economic take-off. One of the features of this economic 
development phase is the rapid development of housing and the real estate industry. For 
instance, Great Britain, France, and Germany's investment in residential construction 
and real estate accounted for about 40% of their total investment during their economic 
take-off stage. Housing construction played a pivotal role in modernization. In 1997, 
the per capita gross national product of China reached US$690, showing that China had 
arrived at such a key stage. It was of strategic significance to take advantage of the 
favourable conditions of stable price and satisfactory finance to intensify housing 
system reform, speed up housing commercialisation and develop housing consumption. 
This would help adjust the national economic structure, promote the upgrading of 
Zhufang Zhidu Gaige Zhengce Wenda Beijing: Zhongguo Wujia Chubanshe, 1998, p.6 
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industries, and ensure sustainable and healthy development of the national economy. 112 
2. Change in national income distribution facilitated housing provision monetisation. 
Since the implementation of the Reform and Opening policy, China has witnessed great 
changes in its income pattern. The general tendency has been for personal income to 
increase while the national fiscal revenues have decreased because of lower 
government deductions from wages. In 1978, national fiscal revenue amounted to 
31.2% ofGDP. By 1997, this had dropped to 11.4%.113 Under such an income pattern, it 
was not appropriate to follow the old housing system, which was dependent on the 
government and state-run enterprises for investment in housing construction. Firstly, 
the government and the state-run enterprises could no longer bear such a burden. 
Secondly, with the residents relying on work units for housing an abnormal 
consumption structure had emerged. For example, decoration costs were higher than 
the amount paid for a residential apartment at the housing reform price. Thirdly, 
residential construction levels were too low to satisfy the growing need of residents for 
housing. 
3. Patterns of macro-demand and micro-demand 
As is well known, a special feature of Chinese consumption is "wave consumption". 
That is to say, consumers are moved to purchase the latest product at the same time as 
others, creating a sharp peak and trough pattern. The 1980s witnessed the 
mass-purchase of the "three major possessions" (san dajian, namely the television set, 
111 Beijingshi Zhufang Zijin Guanli Zhongxin "Geren Zhufang Daikuan Wenda" 1998 (unpublished) 
112 Wang, Xianqing and Wu, Shaoping Huobi Fenfang The Reform Press 1998; pp.71-72 
113 Jianshebu zhuzhai yu fangdichanyesi and Jianshebu zhufang zhudu gaige bangongshi, Dangqian 
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refrigerator, and washing machine), as the major goal of each family. However, from 
the beginning of the 1990s, when the purchasing power of urban residents exceeded the 
I 0,000 RMB level, the expenditure became less conspicuous and was held back for a 
long time, with no new must-have items. Expensive housing and cars naturally became 
a possible target for consumption. This heightened the appeal of the monetisation and 
commercialisation of housing. 
4. Housing reforms gained further urgency and became an area of national focus in the 
wake of the Asian Financial Crisis. Boosting domestic consumption was at the 
cornerstone of China's strategy to weather the effects of the crisis and maintain the 
stipulated growth rate of around 8%t. Housing construction was chosen as one of the 
sectors that could make a significant contribution towards the growth of domestic 
demand. A series of initiatives was launched to encourage people to buy their own 
housing. 114 This would greatly promote the monetisation of housing distribution. 
5. 3 Details of Monetisation Policy 
5. 3. 1. Definition 
Based on a summary of successes achieved during the years of housing reform, and an 
analysis of the existing problems, on 3rd July 1998, the State Council issued The Notice 
on Intensifying Urban Housing Reform and Accelerating Residential Construction 
Zhufang Zhidu Gaige Zhengce Wenda Beijing: Zhongguo Wujia Chubanshe, 1998, p.21 
114 Zhao, Guangren and Qi, Zhaozhen, "1997 Tianjinshi fangdichan shichang xingshi yu fazhan 
zhuzhaiye" in Zhuzhai Jianshe-Xin de Jingji Zengzhangdian Beijing: Zhongguo Jiancai Gongye 
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(Guanyu Jinyibu Shenhua Chengzhen Zhufang Zhidu Gaige Jiakuai Zhufang Jianshe 
de Tongzhi). The Notice (1998) focused on clarifYing the relationships between issued 
involved in housing reform. It set new policy objectives and basic principles for 
reforms in supply, pwvision and change of occupancy. A survey of the general situation 
showed that a rational housing provision pattern should be the first step. How to 
develop such a pattern was considered the core of housing reform. The Notice (1998) 
clearly directed that in kind housing allocation be stopped in the second half of 1998 
(later deferred to 1999), and housing provision be gradually monetised. 
The monetisation of housing provision meant that: "housing provision is included in 
cash wages according to the individual's personal basic payment, length of employment 
and work performance". 115 The real purpose here was to change from in-kind to 
monetary provision and make this the primary form. Specifically, there were two 
principal agents involved in kind provision: the state (or work unit) and the employee. 
In monetised housing provision, there were three principal agents: the state (or work 
unit), the employee and the market. The state (or work units) would provide wages 
according to the employees' work, which included sufficient housing allowance. The 
employees would rent or buy homes in the market with their cash wages. As the macro 
regulator, the government should develop a new regulatory structure for the market, to 
enable it to satisfY the housing requirements of employees. 
According to the theory of value, monetisation of housing provision should ensure that 
housing allowances deducted from employees' wages as a social resource should be 
Chubanshe, 1997, p.64 
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repaid to employees in their wages. The part of the housing consumption fund that had 
been incorporated into the gross product of the country should be separated out and 
included in employees' wages according to the value of their labour. The employees 
could either rent or buy accommodation in the market with their wages. Personal 
housing consumption funds deducted under the old system, which were used by state 
enterprises to build public housing, should also be returned to employees. Thus, 
monetisation of housing provision should go hand in hand with payment system 
reform. 
In terms of distribution channels, instead of using an administrative system, housing 
was to become a commodity to be put into the market so that the employees could 
choose their own residence. This would completely free employees from dependency 
on their work units for housing. The new system would guarantee a certain cash 
housing allowance in the employees' wages, and this would gradually be increased. 116 
5. 3. 2 Implementation 
There were three basic models. 
I. All the costs of buying or renting accommodation to be borne by employees. 
Foreign enterprises in China, and some private businesses applied this system. Their 
employees earned a relatively high salary, had sufficient income for food, clothing, 
housing and transportation, and no longer expected their company to provide housing. 
115 Deng, Xiaohe "Gaige xinlu-zhufang fenpei huobihua" in Jinrong Zaobao, 251h February 1998 
116 Jia, Guangbao and Xu, Youquan "Tuozhan zhufang fenpei huobihua: duice silu" in Zhongguo 
Fangdichan Xinxi, Vol. 4, 1998, p. 8 
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Incorporate housing costs entirely into wages is the ultimate form of housing 
commercialisation, and is the goal of housing reform. But due to slow progress in pay 
reform and state enterprise reform, the time for this to be applied nation-wide had not 
yet come. 
2. Make full use of the Housing Accumulation Fund. 
Getting employers to pay into the Fund produced earmarked savings and turned a 
"covert allowance" into an "overt allowance". It forced employees to accumulate 
savings for housing. This will gradually be incorporated into the employees' income. In 
this way, the Housing Accumulation Fund is an effective form of monetised provision. 
3. Raise housing allowances. 
Where it was difficult for employees to purchase or rent commodity housing with their 
wage income and Housing Accumulation Fund, it was necessary for institutions to raise 
their employees' housing allowance to achieve monetisation of housing provision. 
The sixth item in the Notice (1998) stipulated that: 
"after the abolition of housing distribution in kind, if the ratio of housing 
price and income (that is the ratio ofthe average price of a local Economic 
and Practical Housing apartment with an area of 60 square meters to the 
average income of a two-employee family) is over 4 times, and in areas 
where housing finance and the housing construction fund can be changed 
into housing allowance, housing allowance policy should be applied to 
those employees who have no residence or whose living space has not 
reached the stipulated standard." 117 
There are three ways of providing a housing allowance: a one-off payment, a monthly 
payment and a combination of monthly payment and one-off payment. The housing 
117 see "Guanyu Jinyibu Shenhua Chengzhen Zhufang Zhidu Gaige Jiakuai Zhufang Jianshe de 
Tongzhi", in Beijing Fangdichan Zhengce Fagui Huibian Beijing: Beijingshi Chengshi Jianshe Zonghe 
Bangongshi 1998, pp.399-401 
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allowance pattern is an overt allowance. The value of this Jay in the fact that only an 
overt allowance could break the links between the work unit and the construction, 
purchase and sale of housing. After the housing construction and purchase fund of an 
institution was turned from covert allowance into a totally overt allowance, under 
which the institution paid a monetary housing allowance to its employees, the 
institution was able to break the housing provision umbilical cord with its employees .. 
On most occasions, this could be achieved through providing a housing allowance as a 
transitional measure, and later incorporating this into wages. This had happened 
successfully in the case of grain and oil price reforms. 
The allowance programme included only those employees without housing or whose 
housing had not reached the stipulated living standard. The reasons for this were 
explained by the policy planners as follows. Employees who had received a covert 
allowance in kind should be treated differently from those who had not. For those 
without housing and those who had not reached the stipulated housing standard, when 
they acquired a new residence to improve their housing, this should not be by the 
in-kind system, but they should be helped with a housing allowance to achieve their 
goals in the market. Those who had reached the stipulated housing standard would 
enjoy the government's in-kind discount allowance. No housing allowance would be 
given to them in money. This was the principle of: "new staff, new policy; old staff; old 
policy" (xinren xin banfa, Jaoren lao banfa) which the Notice (1998) adopted while 
emphasizing "stopping provision in kind, implementing monetised provision" (tingzhi 
shiwu fenpei, shixing huobi fenpei). The resources for the housing allowance fund 
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came from the budget for residential construction and housing purchase. Therefore aid 
should first be given to those who had no housing of their own and those who had not 
reached the stipulated housing standard so they could buy their own homes. 
The Notice (1998) stipulated that in those regions where the ratio of house price to 
income was 4: I or lower, where saving 20% of income or less over 20 years would 
enable a family to buy commodity housing with an area of 60 square meters, no housing 
allowance would be paid. 
5. 3. 3. Misinterpretations 
Due to a one-sided interpretation of The Notice (1998), there existed some 
misunderstandings of monetised housing distribution 
I. There was belief that monetisation of housing provision meant employees who 
satisfied the conditions would be given a sum of money equal to the cost ofhousing for 
them to purchase on the market instead of being allocated an in-kind residence. This 
"turning residence into money" approach was actually a variant of the old housing 
provision system, with just a change in form from in-kind to money. There was no 
change in essence. To buy a flat, an employee needed to save for a long period, possibly 
a lifetime. It could not be achieved in only a few months or years of saving. Both 
one-off payment and in-kind provision follow the concept of "allocating a residence" 
rather than incorporating housing consumption into wages. The result could only be 
"employees depending on the state or the state enterprises for housing" rather than 
incorporating housing costs into a family's consumption budget. This went against the 
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policy of housing commercialisation. No work unit could spare so much money as for 
an employee welfare payment. One of the principles for the intensification of housing 
reform was to establish a rational share of responsibility between the government, the 
work unit and the individual. 
2. Another misconception was taking monetisation of housing provision as granting a 
housing allowance to everyone, as treating monetised distribution as identical to a 
housing allowance. In truth, the two differed in many aspects. Monetised housing 
provision included raising wages, establishing the Housing Accumulation Fund and 
adding a housing allowance. China is a large country with many cities, so naturally the 
economic development and house prices differed greatly from place to place. However, 
the employees' income in different regions differed relatively less, resulting in 
significant housing price/income ratio differences. In small towns where the housing 
price was low, ordinary residents could afford a house with their wages, with no need 
for additional allowances. This was referred to as "achieving the goal in one step". In 
medium-sized and small cities, where house prices were not too high, there was a need 
for the Housing Accumulation Fund in addition to employees' wages, in order for them 
to buy their own residences. This was referred to as "achieving the goal in two steps". In 
big cities like Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou, where house prices were much higher, 
in addition to the Housing Accumulation Fund an extra housing allowance was needed 
to enable employees to buy homes. This was referred to as "achieving the goal in three 
steps." 118 
118 Gu, Yunchang, Chang, Xinghua and Wen, Linfeng Shuo Fanggai Hua Maifang Beijing: Jingji Kexue 
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3. The third misconception lay in taking monetisation to mean the complete 
abandonment of welfare housing provision. This resulted from a failure to distinguish 
welfare provision from in kind provision. Monetised housing provision is the basis of 
China's housing reforms. It is based on the abolition of housing provision in kind. This 
does not the ending of welfare housing provision. Welfare housing provision means that 
when the residents do not earn enough income to buy or rent housing at the market price, 
the government grants usage at a low rent or sale at a special price, as an allowance or as 
social welfare relief. Welfare housing provision is a necessary part of the social security 
system. Provision in kind was intended for the vast majority of employees, while 
welfare provision should be limited to a minority. group; in kind provision was basically 
free allocation, while welfare provision should not be totally free, and so still conforms 
to the monetisation concept. 
5. 3. 4. Ancillary Policies 
The Notice (I 998) also emphasized a series of auxiliary policies, to intensify housing 
reform and achieve its goals. 
I. It applies different housing provision policies to different groups: social welfare 
low-rent housing for low income families; Economic and Practical Housing for 
purchase by middle income families; and commercial housing for purchase or rental 
through the market for high income families. 
2. A continuation of public housing reform, including rent reforms and promotion ofthe 
Chubanshe , 1998, pp.5-6 
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sale of public housing. 
3. Development of housing finance: broadening the range of personal housing loans, 
perfecting the housing property rights registration system, developing housing loan 
insurance; developing a combination of Housing Accumulation Fund loans with 
commercial bank loans. 
4. Accelerating the construction of Economic and Practical Housing through various 
supporting measures. 
5. Vigorously fostering the real estate market. 
5. 4 Significance ofMonetisation 
It is accepted that stopping in-kind housing provision and gradually magnetizing it is a 
revolutionary reform of China's housing system, with long-term significance. 119 
1. Its significance is well demonstrated in urban residents' housing consumption 
patterns. Urban residents no longer need to depend on enterprises and institutions for 
housing provision, in other words, they no longer need to "wait for, depend on, and ask 
for". The new motto is: "supporting oneself by ones own capability" in housing 
provision. 
2. Reform in housing provision will inevitably bring a transformation in housing 
construction, and help the development of the housing industry. Urban residents will be 
the primary market for housing and developers will need to study the preferences of 
119 Shang, Junfeng Gaige de Kundian yu Xingfendian Guangdong: Zhuhai Chubanshe, 1998, pp. 
380-384; Hou, Shiyun and Shi, Zhanpeng Zhongguo Fanggai yu Zhu=hai Jianshe Wenti Baogao-Hong 
Lou Wei Ji Shenyang: Shenyang Chubanshe 1998, pl42 
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purchasers and their purchasing power, to improve the design of residences, to raise the 
construction quality and reduce the cost of housing. 
3. The monetisation of housing provision will lead to privately owned property 
determining the structure of property rights. This will greatly strengthen the housing 
industry, promoting rapid growth ofthe housin~ market and of related services. 
4. As urban private residents become the primary investors in housing, this will affect 
the expansion of the housing finance market· and lead to innovation in financing 
mechanisms. 
5. Monetisation of housing provision improves the allocation system, and better 
promotes the principle of pay according to work performance, with priority given to 
efficiency. Those who have accomplished more at work are better paid, and will have a 
larger living space and better living congitions. This will be beneficial to the 
establishment of a vigorous economic system. • 
6. Monetisation of housing provision helps rationalise the consumption patterns of 
urban residents, and promote efficient investment and development. 
7. Monetisation of housing provision can reduce the financial burden on state 
enterprises, and strengthen their market competitiveness, putting them on a level 
playing field with non-state enterprises. In some coastal provinces, the number of 
employees in non-state enterprises now accounts for over half of all employees. The 
dual-track pattern which grew up with, housing in kind for state enterprise employees 
and high salaries for non-state employees, encouraged couples to divide employment 
between the two sectors. This could leave state· enterprises paying for all the housing 
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and giving a covert subsidy to non-state enterprises. Monetisation links the allowance 
to the individual, not the family. 
8. Monetisation of housing provision is beneficial to the development of the labour 
market. The labour market is one of the most important segments of the economy, but 
has developed very slowly in China. One of the main hindrances has been housing 
provision in kind. As housing is difficult to segment, and is only allocated once, the 
effect is that employees who have already been allocated housing have had part of their 
wages prepaid, while others are in arrears. Monetisation resolves the problem of early 
or late payment, over or under payment of this part of the wages. Therefore, housing is 
no longer an obstacle to the development of hib"our market. Furthermore, monetisation 
helps rationalize pay levels. 
9. Monetisation avoids pitfalls in the in-kind allocation system, reducing the corruption 
which causes so much bitterness, and harms social stability. 
5. 5. Drawbacks ofMonetisation 
There is general agreement that with the development of a market-oriented economy, 
commercialisation of urban housing is an inexorable trend. However, monetisation 
does nothing to resolve old grievances and injustices. Those who have been favoured in 
housing allocation in the past, especially government officials and leaders in charge of 
state enterprises, can take advantage of monetisation to strengthen their hold over 
housing, turning decades of inequity, or even illegal occupation, into legal residence. 
Gu Haibing, a professor in the Renmin University of China, argued in an article that in 
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the near future, when there is still so much inequity in urban housing, there is no chance 
of giving people an equal starting point for the commercialisation of urban housing. 120 
There are possible ways of giving state employees equity shares in the existing housing 
stock, including housing built over past decades, and providing an annual housing 
subsidy, based on length of service, which they can draw on to rent or buy property at 
the new higher market prices. Based on the 3.5 billion square meters of housing built in 
the past decades worth 5.22 billion yuan, if 3.3 billion yuan worth were allocated to a 
housing fund for state work unit staff, they should each receive an average of around 
30,000 yuan in subsidy. 
Proponents of the principle of: "new staff, new policy; old staff; old policy" are against 
measure which include a re-examination of the property rights to existing property. 
They argue that this is too complex, would cause social strife would deprive work units 
of their current rights over their property. Inclnding property which has already been 
sold to occupiers and asking them retrospectively to pay more or receive rebates would 
be politically unacceptable. Legally this property belongs to the state, not the work 
units, so they would not be able to contest a state take-over. Over recent year Chinese 
have shown a high capacity to absorb massive changes, so arguments over social or 
political unacceptability may be overstated. 
There are just two basic problems to be solved tl)rough housing reform: raising housing 
standards, and resolving historical inequity of provision. The former is an economic 
problem, while the latter is a political and social problem. Only when enough attention 
120Gu, Haibing "Dui tingzhi fuli fenfang dejidian pinglun" (Comments on stopping welfare housing 
108 
is paid to equity to resolve historical problems, can the future economic goal of housing 
reform be easily achieved. 
Secondly, it is arguP.d that advocating that high-income families buy commercial 
housing, middle-income families buy Economic and Practical Housing and low-income 
families rent low-rent housing conflict with the fundamental goal of commercialization 
of urban housing. There is force in this argument: development of the market is the 
long-term answer. 
5. 6 Influence ofMonetised Housing on Macro-economy 
The new housing reforms affect every part of the society. They will undoubtedly affect 
trends in the future real estate market and the macro-economy. 
5. 6. I Monetisation and the Real Estate Market 
There is no doubt that monetisation will promote housing consumption in the long run. 
The focus of monetised housing provision should be on raising personal housing 
consumption, though this may adversely affect the real estate market in the short run. 
5. 6. 1. 1 Recent Reai Estate Market Trends 
The main problem ofthe real estate market lies in an excess of supply over demand but 
a structural inability to meet demand. For example, from the beginning to the end of 
1999, the Guofang jingqi Index (the National Real Estate Index) was in decline (see 
distribution) in Keji Ribao (Science and Technology Daily}, 291h March, 1998 
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Table 5-7). 121 
Table 5-7 Guofang Jingqi Index in 1999 
Month - February March April May June 
Index 
-
104.88 104.39 103.89 103.28 102.21 
Month July August September ·October November December 
Index 101.65 101.29 100.92 100.17 101.11 101.46 
Source: Guofang zhishu bangongshi "Dichan zhishu" in Jinghua Fangdi (Jinghua Real 
Estate), Vol. 24, 1999, p. 20 and telephone interview to the above office (note: no index 
was released in Jan. 1999) 
1. The total sum of supply and demand 
In 1994, the area of vacant property across the country was 32,890,000 square meters; 
in 1995 it was 50,310,000 square meters; it was 66,240,000 in 1996; and in 1997 the 
area of vacant property reached 70,380,000 square meters. In 1998, a law was issued to 
prohibit in kind housing allocation, decisions were made to promote foster residential 
construction as a growth area and many measures were employed to fill vacant 
properties. As a result, in 1998, the total vacant commodity housing only increased by 
12.4% in comparison with in 1997, to a total of 78,830,000 square meters, valued at 
over 140 billion RMB, though sales reached 114,400,000 square meters, an 
extraordinary increase of 38%. Statistics indicated that the percentage of vacant 
accommodation in China was far higher than international maximum levels. Stimulated 
121 Guofang zhishu bangongshi "Dichan zhishu" in Jinghua Fangdi (Jinghua Real Estate), Vol. 24, 1999, 
p.20 
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by state financial policy, national annual investment in housing development surpassed 
300 billion RMB in 1997. In 1998, it reached 357.96 billion RMB. Including work unit 
developments and private developments, the national construction total in 1998 
amounted to 484 million square meters. 122 The investment in housing in 1999 was 40 I 
billion RMB and construction area reached 551 million sq. meters (see Table 6-1). 
Vacant property increased across the country, as it did in Beijing (see Table 5-8). 
Affected by the investment cycle, the vacancy rate was expected to keep increasing for 
the first year or two of the new century. 
Table 5-8 Statistics for Housing Development in Beijing from Jan. to Oct. 1999 
Jan.-Oct., 1999 Jan.-Oct., 1998 Rate of Growth 
Housing Investment 14980 10980 36.4% 
(million yuan) 
Commodity Housing 1.5 1.8 -16.7% 
Constructed( million sq. 
meters) 
Vacant space( million sq. 3.271 1.678 94.9% 
meter) 
Source: Wang, Hailan "Beijingshi fangdichanye fazhan de jiyu yu kaifa gainian 
chuangxin", in Jinghua Fangdi, Vol. 24, 1999, p. 21 
Seen from the demand angle, due to the prolonged in-kind housing provision under 
which residents received homes at less than the cost price, they tended to depend on 
their work units to solve their housing problems. This greatly reduced demand for 
commodity housing. Though distribution in kind had been ended, it took time to 
readjust the rents of low-cost public housing, change residents' attitudes, and put public 
122 Cai, Jinshui, "Ruhe xiaohua kongzhifang" in JingHua Fangdi (Jinghua Real Estate), Vol.l6, 
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housing into the market. Secondly, the policy initiated forth in 1998 to stop in kind 
housing provision brought about a dramatic increase in institutional housing purchases 
in the first half of the year. But such advance purchasing resulted in a reduction in 
demand in the second half of the year and the following year. Thirdly, in the late 1990s, 
individual housing consumption was not high enough to support the real estate market. 
In 1997, the average residential property price in Beij ing was 5411 RMB/m•, though the 
authorities concerned tried whatever they could to reduce the price. 123 However, the 
city planning situation and land values made it impossible to lower greatly property 
prices, so it was difficult to achieve the goal of housing reform in a short time. To stop 
housing distribution in kind, it was necessary to increase money wages to the 
employees. Full compensation was deemed impossible, so the personal housing 
allowance was not enough to make up for the old housing purchase fund. This 
inevitably led to stagnation in the real estate market. Fourthly, housing reform stipulates 
that housing consumption be borne by individuals. This was bound cut out the excesses 
in demand which characterized institutional consumption under the former system. 
Homes had become larger and more luxurious. When the whole country's real estate 
market was suffering from stagnation, house prices still kept rising in Beijing: this was 
the institutional consumption effect. Once institutional consumption was banned, 
individuals had to take stock of their purchasing power. Fifthly, house prices were 
excessive and related fees were also too high, both of which greatly affected housing 
1999, pp.28-30 
123 Wu, Yi, "1997 Nian quanguo fangdichan kaifa yu shichang fenxi yiji 1998 nian zhanwang" in Beijing 
Fangdichan (Beijing Real Estate), Vol.2, 1998, p.29 
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demand. In the second half of the 1990s, taxes, different fees and profits for the 
developer took up at least half of the purchase price of property. 124 All these factors 
influenced housing demand. 
2. The supply and demand structure 
The supply and demand structure was not balanced. Housing price structure was not in 
balance with the income of most residents, leading to a lack of viable demand. The 
price range of Type Four and Grade Three (Silei sandang) commodity housing in the 
Beijing was 800- 2500 RMB yuan/m• for the was low price range, 2000- 5000 RMB 
yuan/m• for the mid-price range, and 4000 - I 0000 RMB yuan/m• for the high price 
range. 125 The average price was about 10 times the annual income of an urban family, 
far higher than the internationally accepted level of 3 to 6 times. This indicates that 
there were relatively too many properties in the middle and high price ranges. Unequal 
income distribution was also a factor: one-fifth of urban households accounted for 
nearly half the total income of urban residents. 126 Despite total savings of over 5,340 
billion RMB, 90% of ordinary families had average per capita savings of only 1000 
RMB. 127 For most residents, though they wanted to buy their homes, they just did not 
have the necessary purchasing power. Secondly, the variable, high borrowing rate, 
124 For more details, see Li, Xin Kang, Shaotiong and Huang, Weiwen etc., Beijing Fangdichan Shuifei 
Zhinan, Beijing: Yinshua Gongye Chubanshe,1999; Zheng, Hua "Shangpin fangjia weihe nanjiang", in 
Beijing Qingnian Bao, 30th March 2000 
125 Wang, Xianqing and Wu, Shaoping Huobi Fenfang Beijing: Gaige Chubanshe 1998, p.242 
126 Cheng, Siwei Zhongguo Cheng=hen Zhufang Zhidu Gaige-Mubiao M os hi yu Shishi Nandian, Beijing: 
Minzhu yu Jianshe Chubanshe, p. 474 
127 Shanghai Nanyan Jiaoyu Guanli Gongsi Zhongwai Jiaoyu Xinxi Jianbao (Education Weekly), 2"d 
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coupled with an imperfect social security system brought too great a risk to those who 
borrowed money from the bank to buy homes. Though the Central Bank made 
successive reductions in deposit and borrowing rates, with the Housing Accumulation 
Fund following suite, the long-term loan interest rates were still as high as 7.65% and 
5.67% respectively. For example in 1998, to buy a typical apartment at a price of 
RMB300,000, with a 70% 15 year combined loan, at a monthly re-payment rate of 
RMB1855, the actual total cost would be RMB403,900. The combination of unstable 
high interest rates, with concerns about future employment prospects, caused urban 
dwellers to think twice about investing in housing. This had a significant impact on new 
housing demand. 128 Finally, the housing market was not mature. The Grade 1 housing 
market was developing very fast, and the market was becoming stable, but the Grade 2 
housing market was developing very slowly. Although there was great demand in the 
market for the Grade 2 housing, the government did not open this market in all areas. 
This reduced the variety of housing on offer, blocked housing development and reduced 
economic growth. 
5. 6. 1. 2 Future Prospects 
There is high latent demand for housing, and the real estate market has great potential. 
Urban dwellers in China had an average p~·capita living space of no more than 8.7 
square meters in 1997, which was much less than that in Western countries, and even 
March 1999 
128 Beijingshi Zhufang Zijin Guanli Zhongxin "Geren Zhufang Danbao Weituo Daikuan Jianjie" 
(unpublished) 1998; Jian, Hang "Shangye xing geren zhufang daikuan wenda", in Beijing Fangdichan, 
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Singapore and Hong Kong. 129 Moreover Chinese housing cannot compare with 
developed countries in facilities, quality and environment. There are still 4 million 
families in cities experiencing housing difficulties, and nearly 30 million square meters 
of unsafe dwellings badly needing reconstruction. 130 Now that residents' rising income 
means they are no longer worried about food and clothing, the priorities have become 
increasing living space, and improving living conditions. To achieve the goal of raising 
average per capita living space to 13 square meters by 2010, there should be an annual 
increase of 341 million square meters over the next ten years (see Table 5-9). 
Table 5-9. Average per capita Living Space Targets 
Year average per capita Increased living annual increased living 
living space Cm') space (million m') space(million m') 
1978 3.6 -- --
1998 8.7 3151 315.1 
2000 10 1081 360.3 
2010 13 3354 335.4 
Source: Feng, Ge and Li, Bo "Woguo hongguanjingji zhengce yu fangdichan shichang 
zoushi" in Chengxiang Jianshe, Vol.9, 1998, pp. 30-31 
In terms of economic development, according to a survey by the World Bank, when the 
GNP per capita of a country is below US$8000, there will be sustained development in 
housing investment. The per capita GNP of Chiria is not more than I ,000 US dollars, so 
Vol. 10, 1998, pp. 33 
129 Gu, Yunchang, "Zhuzhai Chanye yu Jingji Zhengzhang" in Zhongguo Fangdichan, Vo1.8, 1998, p.4 
130 Wang, Xianqing Zhufang Geming Guangdong Renmin Chubanshe 1998, p.1 
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there is great scope for the development ofthe housing industry. 131 
In terms of urban development, China already has a large urban population, and is 
entering a phase of further rapid urbanization. In foreign countries, where the urban 
population accounts for 30% - 40% of the total, a fast increase in urbanization has 
normally occurred. China has an urban population rate of29%, which approaches that 
of foreign countries. It was predicted that by the end of the "Ninth Five-Year Plan" 
(Jiuwu j ihua) the urban population would increase by 10,750,000, with about 
13,000,000 new married couples. This will make urgent demands on urban housing. 132 
Many old urban areas need reconstruction, especially those areas which do not conform 
to the standards of modern city development. To build new residential areas is a top 
priority. 
In terms of consumption structure, Chinese urban residents' demand for domestic 
electric appliances has already been satisfied. The focus of consumption is now 
gradually shifting to housing and cars. The growth of personal investment will facilitate 
the long-term development of the real estate industry. In China, personal savings are 
growing rapidly and will undoubtedly create great demand for housing investment. 
2. Housing reform generated demand 
The cessation of in-kind housing provision and the increase in money wages, along 
with the establishment of the Housing Accumulition Fund and compensation fund has 
increased spending power of employees, and thereby brought about an increase in valid 
131 Gu, Yunchang, "Zhuzhai Chanye yu Jingji Zhengzhang" in Zhongguo Fangdichan, Vol.8, 1998, p. 5; 
Wang, Wei Zhufang Zhidu Gaige Beijing: Zhongguo Renmin Daxue Chubanshe, 1999, p. 244 
132 Gu, Yunchang, "Zhuzhai Chanye yu Jingji Zhengzhang" in Zhongguo Fangdichan, Vol.8, 1998, p.5 
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demand. 
Completely opening up the Grade 2 market, encouraging the owners to buy and sell 
houses, and increasing housing investment to improve housing conditions has made it 
possible for owners to realise assets held in former public housing. It also increased the 
people's purchasing power, and thus brought about a growth in real demand. 
Gu Yunchang, in "Housing Industry and Economic Growth" (Zhongguo Fangdichan, 
Vol. 8, 1998), offers an estimate of urban housing demand as a result of the above three 
factors (see Table 5-10): 
Table 5-10 Estimate of urban housing demand (unit: ten thousand m') 
Factor~ contributing New ways of opening of Institutional Total 
to the increase m promote new Gradell purchases 
demand housing housing 
market 
Scale of increase in 136-2244 2212-3456 680-850 4238-6550 
demand 
Average increase in 1760 2800 
. 
760 5320 
demand 
3. Feasibility of accelerating housing construction 
The economic growth provided the prerequisite condition for speeding up residential 
construction. Residential construction is compatible with economic growth. The level, 
rate and scale of growth in the national economy, directly affect the development of the 
real estate industry. China has maintained an economic growth of about 10% for a 
decade. This provides the necessary conditions for growth in residential construction. 
On the supply side, construction materials, such as construction steel, cement, and glass 
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are in oversupply, with large stocks. At the same time, government departments are 
making a joint effort to speed up the modernization of residential construction. They are 
working on production efficiency, quality control, design, standardisation of 
components and other measures aimed at raising productivity levels. 
5. 6. 2 Effects ofMonetisation on Economic Growth 
The acceleration of housing reform and monetisation of provision has had a substantial 
effect on raising supply and demand. The housing industry is fundamental to the 
national economy, and is gradually becoming the mainstay of the development of the 
economy. In the long run, sustained development of the housing industry is certain to 
make a steady contribution to the national economy. 
!.Property based assets are the basis for national economic development. They help 
raising people's consumption levels and quality oflife. For instance, in 1985 in the USA, 
27% of gross assets were real estate. 133 The support of rich real estate asset base is vital 
for strong national economic growth. 
2.There is high synergy between the housing industry and other related industries. The 
housing industry involves construction materials, transportation, energy resources, 
metallurgy, the chemical industry, electronics, communications, and machinery; there 
are altogether more than 2000 types in more than 50 industries. Increased demand for 
housing gives direct impetus to demand in other related industries. 
3. In all developed economies the housing industry's contribution to economic growth 
133 Wang, Wei Zhufang Zhidu Gaige Beijing: Zhongguo Renmin Daxue Chubanshe 1999, p.l 
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has become the backbone of national economy. In terms of real estate as a percentage of 
GDP, in Japan it was I 0.4% in 1998, in Hong Kong it was 20.6% in 1990, in Taiwan it 
was 10% and in the Unites States it was 10-15% in 1993. China lags behind. It was 
expected to reach 5% in 2010, and 10% or in 2020 when it is expected to become a key 
industry. In the next twenty years of economic growth in China, the development ofthe 
housing industry will make a great contribution. 134 
5. 6. 3 Monetisation and Inflation 
Real estate investment demands heavy injections of cash, and is very likely to stimulate 
inflation. However, it also boosts future total supply, and in this respect may keep down 
inflation. Hence real estate has a two-sided effect, both positive and negative, on 
inflation. For real estate investment have a restraining effect on inflation, the 
prerequisite is that the commodity housing, which is constructed, must conform to the 
demands ofthe housing market. 
5. 6. 3. 1 Monetisation and Funding 
The implementation of monetisation requires the addition of a housing allowance to the 
. 
wages of employees. But in most work units, hqusing allowances replace investment in 
new construction by the work unit. In other words, this is a transfer, not an additional 
sum and will not of itself increase demrtnd. With provision monetised, the operation of 
134 Gu, Yunchang "Zhuzhai Chanye yu Jingji Zhengzhang" in Zhongguo Fangdichan, vol. 8, 1998, 
pp.4-1 0 
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residential construction funds is completely changed. The work units are freed from 
housing provision. The funds operate in accordance with market forces, increasing both 
fairness and efficiency. 
The old channel for funds was: 
Housing allowances 
r---P 
Housing constructed b\ 
t--
included in employees' work units 
wages 
t-- Wages in kind 
(Housing) ·1 Employees I 
L....;:. Housing purchased by 1-
work units 
Now it is: 
Wagesincurrency L::~~~~~~~~~~~==~~~ Housing allowances f-~!2..;;;:~...;;,::;~....:...:;..----'!>l Bank 
Draw the deposit 
included in employees 
wa es 
Money to 
buy 
housing 
Housing Grant 
loans 
Housing developers 
Pay debts 
It can be seen that monetisation only changes the channel for funds, without changing 
the macro supply. This may mean there is no change in total funding supply brought 
about by monetisation. 
From this, it can be concluded that monetisation itself will not affect the supply and 
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demand of funds, and hence will not stimulate inflation. In recent years, China's 
economic growth has slowed down and China has experienced deflation. State macro 
supervision is therefore geared to stimulating economic growth, and so investment has 
been raised, especially in residential construction. The adoption of this method is in line 
with the goal of developing the national economy through increasing domestic demand. 
It also has the effect of satisfying employees' actual housing demand in the post-
monetisation era. The state will go on increasing housing investment in the coming 
years, and the increased funding supply will stimulate prices increases in the short term. 
This is the result of China's macro-control, and not inflation caused by monetisation. 
5. 6. 3. 2 Effect ofMonetisation on Aggregate Supply and Demand 
In the application of monetisation, the additional money wages are coordinated with 
raising rents and the cessation of in-kind provision in order to achieve the goal of 
directing funds into specific purposes. It will not have any impact on the consumption 
of other commodities or the aggregate demand for other commodities. But, with the 
implementation of monetisation, people now have the right and the opportunity to 
choose their own homes. People's residential preferences and desire for a better quality 
of life has become the decisive factor in housing demand, and is sure to bring about 
change in its structure. 
As far as supply is concerned, only housing that accords with what people want will 
realise its value in the market. Housing that does not accord with people's needs will be 
ignored. Recently a considerable amount of inexpensive suburban commodity housing 
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has appeared on the market. This housing is well designed and enjoys convenient 
transportation links to the city, and as such, is highly regarded by consumers. Thus, 
following the implementation of monetisation, housing supply has increased as 
property developers gradually learn to satisfy the demands of consumers. This increase 
in supply should hold back inflation. 
In the short term, monetisation of housing supply will not have a great impact on 
funding demands or supplies, and so cannot be considered inflationary. A price rise 
would be most likely attributable to macro-control. In the long run, the housing supply 
structure will adjust to meet the changing needs of the housing demand structure, so 
price rises should be restrained. In this way, monetisation can bring about a rise in 
peoples' living standards, a change in housing supply, and improvement in enterprise 
profits and steady growth in the national economy. 
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Chapter 6 Condusion 
Through this analysis of China's housing system reforms in the 1990s, it can be 
concluded that, overall, housing reform in the 90s was highly successful. This was 
especially true when, towards the end of the 90s, a breakthrough was made with 
monetisation ofhousing supply as the core ofthe reforms (see Table 4-1 and Table 4-2). 
During the eight years from 1991-1998, national investment in urban housing 
construction reached 1,910 billion yuan and 2.092 billion sq. meters of housing were 
constructed. 135 Statistics show that families whose average per capita living space is 
above 8 square meters accounted for 13.5% ofall the families in 1981,48.1% in 1988, 
and 76.8% in 1998, displaying a substantial increase. This shows the benefit housing 
reform brought an improvement in people's living conditions. By the end of 1998, 
68.3% of Chinese families had moved into their apartments. 136 
Table 6-1 Area ofHousing Occupied by Urban Families in 1998 
Floor space <30 31-40 41-50 51-60 61-80 >80 
of housing 
(sq. meter) 
Family 17% 17% 21% 20% 17% 8% 
proportion 
Source: Cheng, Siwei Zhongguo Chengzhen Zhufang Zhidu Gaige-Mubiao Moshi yu 
Shishi Nandian, 1999, p.292 
135 Dai ,Gongxing "Woguo zhuzhai chanye fazhan de xianzhuang, mianlin de wenti ji xiangying de 
duice" in Jinghua Fandi, Vol. 17, 1999, p. 17 
136 Guojia Tongjiju, "Cong shuzi kan bianhua", Beijing Chenbao, 16th September 1999 
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Table 6-2 Chinese Urban Housing Construction and Living Conditions 
Year Investment (million Constructing space Living space per 
yuan) (million sq. meter) capita (sq. meter) 
1978 3754 38 3.6 
1990 29704 173 6.7 
1991 52333 193 6.9 
1992 75077 240 7.1 
1993 175223 307 7.5 
1994 248780 357 7.8 
1995 299372 375 8.1 
1996 298723 394 8.5 
1997 297711 405 8.8 
1998 357960 484 9.0 
1999 401017 551 9.6 
Source: Cheng, Siwei Zhongguo Chengzhen Zhufang Zhidu Gaige-Mubiao Moshi yu 
Shishi Nandian, 1999, p.164-165; Chen, Hui "Renmin shenghuo zhubu gaishan", in 
Beijing Qingnianbao, 27th March, 2000 
But at the same time, the housing reforms in the 90s also exhibited many problems and 
loopholes. 
First, the reforms lasted for ten years at a disappointing pace, starting slowly with the 
four main housing reform measures in the first half of the 90s and then rapidly speeding 
up towards the end of the 90s with monetised housing provision as the key measure. 
Looking back, it would have been possible to implement monetisation from the first 
124 
phase in the early 1990s. This would have reduced the difficulty and cost ofthe housing 
reforms. 
The main causes of the slow progress were man-made. Housing reform was in reality a 
re-distribution and readjustment of benefits. The decision makers and executors of the 
housing reform policy were mostly people who had already benefited. Reform to them 
meant losing some of their accrued benefits. 137 It is easy to imagine why there was 
resistance to housing system reforms. 
A further aspect of reform in the 90s was a failure to develop the market. 138 The goals of 
reform were efficiency and equity. Generally speaking, efficiency mainly results from 
the market. Therefore, the main task of the government is to develop the market, and 
this is achieved by economic means. During the decades from 1949, when the 
Communist Party of China first gained power, to 1978, when housing reform was 
initiated, the government tried its best to solve the housing problem and to raise the 
quality of housing by administrative means. This failed. Although housing reforms 
achieved a great deal in the 90s, this was cmly in the public housing sector. As far as 
development of the market was concerned, the 90s did not see much improvement, 
although this was a more important way to promote the commercialisation of housing. 
The two big problems of high house prices and an excess of vacant commercial housing 
are closely related to the failure to develop the market. To make residential construction 
137 Wang, Xiaoguang Gao, Guoli and Fan, Caiyao Zhufang Tizhi Gaige Guangdong: Guangdong Jingji 
Chubanshe, 1999,p. 152 
138 Ren, Zhiqiang "Fangdichan Kaifa zhong de Lilun he Zhengce" in Kan, Jun eds. Toushi yu Fenxi 
Beijing: Zhongguo Renshi Chubanshe 1998, pp.112-115 ; Ren, Zhiqiang "Fanggai dui Shichang Jingji 
de Yingxiang" and "Fanggai Zhengce he Shichang Jingji de Guanxi" in Kan, Jun eds. Toushi yu Fenxi 
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a new economic growth point and a focus of consumption, the government has to resort 
to the development of the market, without which there will be no efficiency. It is 
impossible to achieve commercialisation of residential property just through a few 
administrative sale-promotion measures. In fact, the Chinese government has all along 
been using a three-pronged approach of part market regulation, part administrative 
guidance, and part a combination of government and individual initiatives. However, 
there has been too much reliance on administrative guidance and too little on economic 
methods. This policy may be useful as a means of making the transition to a 
market-based system, but it is ultimately harmful to the development of the market and 
should not be maintained for long, otherwise it will affect the attainment of the housing 
reform objectives. 
Housing system reform in China has achieved a great deal in a short time. The future 
prospects are bright, but a lot of effort has still to be made. To end the paper, it is most 
appropriate to quote the words of the late Sun Zhongshan, the first president of the 
Republic of China: "comrades, you have to make further effort." 
Beijing: Gaige Chubanshe 1999, pp.l92-203 
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